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Overview scheme (see research proposal):
The structure of the variables involved in the theoretical explanation is the
following one:
1. Change agents (many implying or stimulating differentiation; some pushing
for integration): e.g. demographic, economic, technological, institutional, and
cultural developments and feedback from the problem situation
2. Initial changes in directly affected regime elements implying more
complexity and sometimes more integration
3. Adjustment by other regime elements to initial changes through adaptive
mechanisms involving values, cognitions, and resources
4. A. More complex regimes B. More integrated regimes
(‘multi’-format of elements) (high intensity of exchange)
5. A. More complete coverage B. More successful implementation +
of uses and users + more risk more mutually reinforcing side effects
of intra regime counter activity of regime elements
6. A. Indications of a more B. Indications of a more sustainable
sustainable water resource water resource use due to better
use due to better coverage implementation and more positive
(cf. previous situation) + and less negative side effects
indication of threats to
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41 Introduction and research model
First an brief statement of the research goal (see proposal). Then an outline of
the research model (on the basis of the proposal with possible changes due to
developments in the crafting of this piece). Followed by an outline of the rest of
the report itself.
On the model: I propose that the boxes of policy institutions and policy process
are re-labelled ‘General and external policy xyz’, to make clear what the relation
with the rest of the model is. Next to these boxes also a box called ‘major
societal developments’ is added. This box contains demographic, cultural,
economic or physical (technological and spatial) developments. From these
boxes, arrows, named ‘change agents’, flow to the public governance and
property rights boxes. Thirdly, a feed back line from the ‘use’ box should be
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Feedback from the problem situation
Explanation:
1. ‘Old’ (= proposal) boxes changing cultural and judicial conceptions of
property
2. Economic (and other) major societal developments added by Doris
3. Influence on definition of property rights from public governance
4. ‘Old’ boxes plus ‘other policies’ influences as change agents
5. Major societal developments as change agents
6. Feedback from problem situation (water resource use and resource status)
as change agent
7. The ‘switchboard’ box
7.
52 Water use and users
On the basis of the proposal, the discussions in Barcelona and Lausanne about
the relevant aspects for case selection, the Swiss conceptual work; and maybe
also own earlier work on privatisation and the public tasks in water
management.
In my view managing a “sustainable water use” is not only to prevent over-use
and degradation of water resources, but also to protect the ecological functions
of the water resource. This might be important to make explicit since in various
cases – at least in the Netherlands - it is precisely the competition between
human uses and the ‘use’ by nature that forms the basis of the sustainability
problem at hand.
63 Types of 'Property Rights'
According to our project design, an institutional resource regime consists of a
system of property rights (called regulative system in the proposal) and a policy
design.  Before we can turn to an analysis of institutional resource regimes,
therefore, we need to establish an understanding of these two components:
property rights and policy design.  This chapter takes the first step towards this
objective by discussing property rights, specifically their nature and role, their
implications for environmental resource management, as well as property
regimes and types of property rights.  The next chapter, in turn, will focus on
policy and its elements.
3.1 The Nature and Role of Property Rights
Property rights delineate rights of ownership in an asset, which generally
include the rights to use and consume the asset, to exclude others from the use
of the asset, to change its form and substance, to obtain income from it, and to
transfer these rights either in their entirety through sale or partially/temporarily,
for instance through rental (Barzel 1989, Furubotn and Pejovich 1975, Kasper
and Streit 1998).  While property rights may be exclusive, they are generally not
unrestricted.1  Governments, for example, often impose regulations limiting the
owners' options in terms of how they can use their resource (a point we will take
up again in chapter 6).
Correspondingly, economists argue that property rights should be conceived of
as bundles of rights (Barzel 1989, Kasper and Streit 1998).  With respect to
environmental resources, for instance, property rights exist and frequently differ
for the stock of a resource and the produced yield or the goods and services
derived from a resource.  "Ownership of the resource" would thus pertain to a
specific bundle of rights the owner holds with respect to the resource.  The
owner may, for example, hold the right to farm the land, but not to kill rare
species on the land.
We usually do not think about the specific bundle of rights we are purchasing
when buying a good, because we have a common general understanding of
what those rights are.  Likewise, in legal terms, the purchase of a good is
generally understood to mean the purchase of a given set of rights.  Obtaining
title to real estate, for instance, generally means that we have the right to live on
our real estate, but not to kill somebody on our real estate.2  This societal and
legal understanding of which rights are included in our purchase does not
negate the economic perspective of the (changeability of) bundles of rights,
                                           
1 This fact is important to remember in the context of debates on the environmentally desirable
property regime.  In this debate, private property rights are often treated as absolutes, which in
reality they rarely are.  Rather than having to choose between private property regimes,
common property regimes, and state ownership, the imposition of some constraints on private
property often is a reasonable alternative.
2 Except in self defence, in which case we do have that right.
7however.  After all, contractual specifications of bundles of rights in a property
transfer are possible that differ from the "normal" case, and courts frequently
have to deal with cases questioning whether an owner of a good or asset had
the right to carry out a particular action.  There are limits to the bundling and
unbundling of property rights from a legal perspective, of course, as some
contractual agreements on specific bundles of rights might be viewed as
unconstitutional or immoral.3  Furthermore, property owners may not be able to
unbundle a particular right, often a negative right, i.e. responsibility associated
with their property ownership.  In general, however, the economic perspective
on property rights as bundles of rights cannot be easily rejected.
Notions about which specific rights generally go with the ownership of a good or
asset and the extent to which it is possible to unbundle specific rights differ
across time and culture.  Thus, it is much more common to differentiate
between specific rights to attributes of a good or asset in the Common Law
tradition than in German law, for instance.  This is somewhat ironic, since the
Common Law tradition happens to be based on old Germanic legal frameworks
(in which this unbundling was possible).  In contrast, German law today is
influenced by the Roman concept of property rights, to which the countries on
the continent reverted in the context of the "creation" of the concept of territorial
sovereignty associated with the Westphalian peace in the 17th century.  Under
Roman law, unbundling was generally much more limited, especially with
respect to real estate.  Thus, the owner of real estate owned everything below
the area of land as well as the space above the area of land.  In consequence,
owning apartments, for instance, was not possible under Roman law.  Despite
this difference in traditions, notions of bundling and unbundling are not written in
stone, of course.  Thus, unbundling is becoming much more common on the
European continent these days, while in the United States property owners are
fighting against the right of government to interfere with specific rights
associated with their property (see chapter 6).
With respect to natural resources, the focus on "bundles of rights" highlights
that property rights to multiple attributes of a resource can exist and be held by
different individuals or groups.  Even different "property regimes" (see below)
are likely to exist with respect to the attributes of many environmental
resources.  Property rights and regimes for such a resource thus tend to form a
complex structure with several layers and dimensions.
In the context of this project, this layering of property rights is of particular
importance, since the project aims to emphasize heterogeneous demands for
water resources.  In contrast, much of the literature to date, such as Ostrom's
early irrigation studies, has focused on homogenous uses.  One way to
characterize the difference between the two situations may be to distinguish
between competing and conflicting property rights.  In the case of scarcity in a
homogenous use situation, property rights are competing with each other, while
in the case of scarcity in a heterogeneous use situation, property rights are also
conflicting with each other.  The objective of policy intervention in the context of
an institutional resource regime, then, is to lead to a coordination and
                                           
3 Such limits on unbundling can also exist in terms of the feasibility of the separation of property
rights to different attributes to the resource.
8harmonization of rights to different attributes of the resource and pursue
sustainable management through a reduction in conflict between these rights
(this argument will be taken up again in chapter 6).
Property rights play a pivotal role in society as they structure the relations
between decision makers with respect to any natural resource.
For property rights are defined not as relations between men and things,
but, rather as the behavioural relations among men that arise from the
existence of things and pertain to their use.  The prevailing system of
property rights assignments in the community is, in effect, the set of
economic and social relations defining the position of interacting
individuals with respect to the utilization of scare resources (Pejovich
1975, p. 40).
Property rights are, of course, similarly fundamental in any social context and
with respect to any good or asset.  As Stubblebine (1975) argues, the definition
of property rights becomes necessary as soon as two individuals share a living
environment, e.g. with Friday's arrival on Crusoe's island: "Some set of property
rights must, and will, be created to condition the relationship between these two
individuals - whether that set be characterized as capitalistic, socialistic, or
something else" (p. 13).  This definition of rights will take place, whether or not
the institution of "property rights" has been intentionally created by the
community or by an outside authority and enforcer.
In combination with social norms, available technologies, and resource
conditions, property rights yield collective outcomes in social settings (Young
1994).  They determine the allocation and use of resources, composition of
output, and distribution of income which result from interacting decision makers:
"Such institutions critically affect decision making regarding resource use and,
hence, affect economic behaviour and performance.  By allocating decision-
making authority, they also determine who are the economic actors in a system
and define the distribution of wealth in a society" (Libecap 1993, p. 1).  In an
increasingly complex world with interactions between decision makers across
space and time, the definition of relationships through property rights provides
the foundation for environmental and economic activity.
The institution of property rights can take a variety of forms.  Property
institutions "range from formal arrangements, including constitutional
provisions, status, and judicial rulings, to informal conventions and customs
regarding the allocations and use of property" (ibid.).  In contrast to traditional
societies with dense social networks and accordingly low transaction costs, the
interactions in today's Western societies require "elaborate institutional
structures that constrain participants and minimize transaction costs" in the
form of well-specified and well-enforced property rights (North 1989, p1320f).
93.2 Changes in Property Rights
While we tend to think of property rights as long-term, stable relations of
ownership, property rights are never constant.  Two major perspectives on
changes in property rights and their long-term stability exist.
In the economic perspective, property rights are always in flux.  In a functioning
society, property rights are continuously being created, altered, and abandoned
(Barzel 1989).  As individuals desire to adjust to changed economic, political,
and social conditions, they, thus, create demand for a change in property rights
until they are satisfied and have reached a new "equilibrium" position in rights
over resources.4  Property rights to resources are determined by the interaction
of supply and demand in dynamic sequences.  This logic is most clearly
expressed in Stubblebine's "Axiom of Modification": "Every individual seeks
those property rights modifications which he believes will improve his welfare"
(Stubblebine 1975, p. 15).  As utility maximisers, in the economic perspective,
people delineate and exercise property rights up to the point where the marginal
costs of doing so exceed the marginal benefits, leaving the remainder in the
public domain.
People acquire, maintain, and relinquish rights as a matter of
choice…People choose to exercise rights when they believe the
gains from such actions will exceed their costs.  Conversely, people
fail to exercise rights when the gains from owning properties are
deemed insufficient, thus placing (or leaving) such properties in the
public domain.  What is found in the public domain, therefore, is what
people have chosen not to claim.  As conditions change, however,
something that has been considered not worthwhile to own may be
newly perceived as worthwhile; conversely, what was at first owned
may be placed in the public domain (Barzel 1989, p. 65).
Individuals' "calculations" of the net-benefit of changes in property rights, in
turn, are affected by a number of factors such as changes in relative factor
scarcities and relative prices, technological changes (affecting the costs of
monitoring and enforcing property rights among others), changes in knowledge
(changes in production functions, market values), or the opening of new
markets, and the interaction between these factors.  North, for instance, argues
that institutional change in the past has been predominantly caused by changes
in relative prices, which in turn are a function of population growth,
technological change, and changes in the cost of information, with population
growth being historically the single and most important factor (North 1989, p.
1324).  Feeny, likewise, claims that an appreciation in the relative price of a
factor leads to an "increase in the demand for an institution to define property
rights in that factor" (Feeny 1988, p.273).  He draws empirical support for his
                                           
4 Property rights, thus, are continuously determined at the margins in an ongoing endogenous
process. (Obviously, property rights are determined exogenously as well, for instance, through
political changes such as revolutions or transitions from communist to capitalist regimes or even
through "simple" policy changes (see chapter 6).)
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argument from historical evidence of rising demand for property rights
associated with the rising value of land in several South East Asian countries.
Likewise, Ensminger and Rutten (1991) show that the desired system of
property rights changed with ensuing economic growth and increasing
sedentarization in the case of the Galole Orma of Kenya, as common property
near settlements increased in value and the gains from the exclusion of
nomadic herds increased.  Property rights, then, are created or changed in
response to economic forces, as opportunities to gain arise.
In contrast to the economic perspective, legal and political philosophy would
emphasize the tendency of property rights to resist and work against change.
Thus, one can argue that individuals tend to perceive property rights as rather
permanent, and do not constantly perform cost-benefit calculations to determine
the presently best allocation of property rights for them.5  Furthermore, they
might value "property ownership" independently of its direct economic return,
because of personal values or status considerations, for instance.  In addition,
individuals are also guided in their actions by norms and habits, which tend to
work against constant and rapid change on the basis of rational calculations.
Finally, legal provisions and normative conceptions in society can prevent a
maximization in property rights due to economic calculations.  Thus, normative
conceptions might prohibit or at least question the possibility of ownership, as in
the case of a human being or, for instance, the world oceans.  In consequence,
property rights discussions are frequently associated with normative debates or
frameworks.
3.3 Property Regimes
The literature on environmental resource management generally differentiates
between different property regimes, i.e. property arrangements characterized by
different combinations of property rights, in terms of ownership, access, and
withdrawal regulations.  The most common categorization of property regimes
differentiates between private property, common property, open-access, and
state-ownership (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson 1990, Devlin and
Grafton 1998).  While these property regimes can exist with respect to any
good, we will focus in the following discussion on natural resources, since this is
the focus of the project.
Private property according to this differentiation exists when the exclusive title
to the resource is held by individuals or corporations.  Accordingly, the
respective individual or corporation has control over access to the resource,
and is backed in this capacity by the state.  Furthermore, the individual or
corporation have decision-making capacity with respect to the management of
the resource.
                                           
5 In addition, the bounded rationality arguments, of course, apply (see chapter 3), and/or as
some scholars call it, a boundary of imprecision in human decision making (Windrum and
Birchenhall 1998).
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Common property as a term has been used or rather abused in the literature
because of its vague application (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).  In the
conventional categorization of property regimes it is important to differentiate
situations of common property from situations of open-access or common pool
resources in general.  Common property generally refers to resources for which
the exclusive title is in the hands of a group of individuals or a corporation.  This
group has control over access to the resource, is frequently backed in this
capacity by the state, and has general decision-making capacity over the
resource.  Common property regimes can exist in that a small, voluntary group
owns a resource and can exclude outsiders, but also in cases in which a large,
inclusive group with compulsory membership owns the resource (Kasper and
Streit 1998, p. 186).  The latter possibility shows the difficulties of differentiating
between common property and open-access, at least from an economic
perspective.
Open-access refers to situations in which property rights have not been defined,
i.e. nobody holds exclusive title to the resource.  Accordingly, there is no
possibility of access control and exclusion of non-owners, and no regulated
decision-making process.  From an economic perspective, as we will show in
chapter 6, this situation is very similar to one in which everybody "owns" the
resource, i.e. the ownership of the large, inclusive group with compulsory
membership described above.
Finally, state-ownership generally is used to refer to situations in which the state
holds the exclusive title to a resource and controls access to the resource.
Frequently, state-owned resources are open to access by the public.  Thus, it
may seem that state-ownership refers to a situation in which there is limited
potential to exclude non-owners.  It is our view, however, that this is a function
of convention rather than a necessary legal or economic characteristic of state-
ownership.  Fundamentally, the state can control access to the resource.  In
situations of state-ownership, decision-making capacity with respect to the
resource is, of course, in the hands of the state.
The categorization of property regimes as private property, common property,
open-access, and state-ownership is not unchallenged.  From an economic and
even in many cases from a legal perspective, common property resources are
(similar to) private property, for instance.  Moreover, the traditional view of a
resource as being under one specific property regime is no longer maintained,
as scholars highlight that for any specific resource numerous property regimes
for the different attributes and functions of the resource exist (see above).
Furthermore, state-ownership of rights to resources frequently takes the form of
government intervention in private rights.  Thus, any property arrangement can
be thought of as a distribution of rights between government and private
individuals.  We will take up again such problems with the conventional
differentiation of property regimes in chapter 6, when we suggest a different
way of conceptualising property arrangements.
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3.4 Property Rights and Environmental Stewardship
Property rights have been long hailed by economists as a provider of positive
incentives for environmental stewardship.  The basic idea here is that property
rights are important for resource regimes because people tend to take better
care of what belongs to them than of the possessions of other people or the
collective (see the ‘tragedy of the commons’ story below), and thus should be
granted rights to the resources they use.  However, there are some problems
with this idea which we will discuss after having laid out the original argument
below.
3.4.1 The Traditional Economic Argument
From an economic perspective, property rights affect the potential for
environmental stewardship by structuring choice sets for consumption and
investment decisions.  As decision makers base withdrawal and investment
decisions on expectations about returns, property rights define the distribution
of incentives decision makers face when maximizing their utility in the context of
scarce resources.  Only if decision makers have the assurance that they can
control revenue in the long run, will they have an incentive to maintain the value
of a natural resource and make consumption and investment decisions
accordingly.
In terms of consumption decisions, the assurance of long-term control induces
property owners to limit withdrawal from natural resources to a sustainable
level, so that the resource can continue to provide benefits in the long run.
The concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentive
to utilize resources more efficiently…The development of private
rights permits the owner to economize on the use of those resources
from which he has the right to exclude others (Demsetz 1975, p.31).
Owners of a fishing ground, in this argument, are more likely to harvest just the
amount of fish that allows a stable population, capable of renewing itself, to
remain, if they can limit the access of other appropriators from the fishing
ground.  Owners of grazing grounds have an incentive to limit the number of
cattle on the pasture to avoid the degradation of the land, if they can be sure
that the benefit of "restraint" will not be predominantly consumed by other cattle
owners.
In the absence of control, in contrast, overexploitation and eventually depletion
or destruction of natural resources are likely.  If decision makers lack control
over long term costs and benefits in the absence of property rights, because
they cannot exclude others from the use of the resource, it may be rational for
them to forego long-term benefits in favour of lesser short-term benefits.  In
other words, if use of the resource by others cannot be prevented, decision
makers can optimise private benefit (in the absence of cooperation) only by
increasing their own withdrawal rates above the social optimum, as gains are
distributed on a first-come, first-serve basis.
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Like consumption, decisions in terms of rate and form of investment are a
function of control over the benefits provided by a natural resource in the long
run.  Investing means sacrificing today's consumption for tomorrow's
consumption in the expectation of net gain.  If the expected net gain is small
because of high uncertainty (which translates into the application of a high
discount rate to future returns), the potential investor has no motivation to
forego today's consumption.  The lower the expected returns are, the lower the
optimal amount of investment.  A natural resource for which no secure property
rights exist, in consequence, can suffer from lack of necessary inputs to sustain
itself.  Appropriators from fresh water sources, for instance, have less
incentives to invest in facilities to keep the water clean, if they are unlikely to
capture a sufficient share of the return on their investment, because most of the
water is withdrawn by other appropriators.  Likewise, farmers sharing fields
have less incentives to invest in irrigation provisions if they know that rival
farmers will capture a major part of the return on their investment.6  If owners do
make investments the context of insecure property rights, they have an
incentive to invest in inputs that are more easily sold or used elsewhere.  They
will shy away from high sunk costs, which make disinvestments costly.
Furthermore, if the uncertainty of their control results from joint use of an asset
with others, they are likely to invest in inputs with higher levels of excludability,
i.e. for which monitoring and enforcement costs are lower.
In sum, according to the original economic argument, the absence of secure
property rights can cause environmental (and economic) waste.  For natural
resources, the subsequent dynamics lead to unsustainable exploitation rates
and underinvestment in necessary inputs.  These dynamics are best captured
in the literature on collective action and "the tragedy of the commons."
Any collective action situation is characterized by a divergence between social
and private costs and benefits, in other words, externalities, as not all costs of
an individual's action are borne by that individual, and not all benefits from an
individual's action accrue to that individual.  Collective action problems exist
whenever property rights are not fully defined, which means they always exist.
As the costs of defining rights to every single attribute of a good are prohibitive,
the benefits of those attributes for which the costs of defining property rights
outweigh the gains are transferred to the public domain.7 Thus, while we might
                                           
6 Note, that individuals often do not just calculate their own costs and benefits in such situations
though, which is where the economic argument is insufficient.  Frequently, individuals will
abstain from appropriate investments - even if they would receive a net-benefit - if other
individuals have the potential to free-ride, because they conceive such free-riding as unfair.
Thus, norms do play a significant role in influencing individual decisions, besides economic
incentives.
7 In every transaction involving the exchange of property rights, the costs of obtaining the
necessary information about each of the multitude of attributes of a good prevent the complete
definition of the rights that are being transferred: "Because transacting is costly, as an economic
matter property rights are never fully delineated" (Barzel 1989, p.1).  Because of the costs
involved in stipulating and monitoring these attributes, parties to an exchange limit negotiations
and delineation of rights to those attributes they consider worth the effort (for which the benefits
outweigh the costs, thus satisfying multiple marginal equivalencies rather than one).  Barzel
argues that any attribute for which no stipulations are made and that therefore can be varied
becomes a "free attribute"", "common property" or in the context of this discussion "open-
access."  With these attributes being relinquished to the public domain, anybody can choose to
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tend to see land over which no property rights have been defined, for instance,
as an open-access resource involving collective action problems, even land
held as private property is associated with some collective action problems,
caused for example by the impact of the specific form of land use on the air or
groundwater quality in the area (for which property rights are not defined and
enforced).  While a better definition of property rights, then, reduces collective
action problems, the impossibility of a perfect delineation of property rights
implies that collective action problems will always exist.8  This is especially the
case, if we view nature itself as a stakeholder (part of the collective action
arena, but unable to speak for itself).  In many cases of natural resources
management, nature or ecosystem sustainability, i.e. the nature support
function of a water resource, for instance, is one of the rival uses to be taken
into account when analysing the collective action problems.
In the context of environmental resources, a complete or partial lack of property
rights is frequent and severe collective action problems abound.  They reach
from global problems, such as global warming, ozone depletion, and questions
of biodiversity, to local problems such as the pollution and destruction of fresh
water resources.  This abundance of collective action problems partly results
from the nature of many environmental resources, i.e. their limited excludability,
which make the definition and enforcement of private property rights costly, and
(partial) rivalness.
Collective action problems, thus, reflect a lack of individual control over the
long-term use and management of natural resources, and are associated with
the patterns of overuse and exploitation identified above.  The rate at which
individuals extract from a natural resource, which is determined by private costs
and benefits, would exceed the optimal rate in terms of social/environmental
costs and benefits.  This dynamic has been recognized by various scholars
such as Hardin9 (1968), who argues that the necessary outcome of collective
action problems in the context of environmental resources is the "tragedy of the
commons." Hardin highlights the results of the divergence between individual
and social rationality in the absence of coercion in the case of a communal
grazing area.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add
                                                                                                                               
spend resources (monetary or other) on the capture of their benefits.  Optimisation thus means
a less than full delineation of property rights: "perfect delineation is prohibitively costly" (Barzel
1989, p. 64).
8 For collective action problems to be completely avoided rather than reduced, contrary to
Coase (1960), we do not only need property rights, but also a perfectly functioning market
proving for a "correct" value of those property rights.  The question of how to achieve that for
many environmental resources is one of the fundamental concerns in the environmental field
today, of course, as intergenerational dynamics, scientific uncertainty, and those characteristics
of natural resources that make the assignment of property rights difficult to begin with
complicate the assignment of monetary values.
9 Hardin and the "father" of Collective Action, Mancur Olson, were not the first scholars to reveal
the dynamics around collective action problems, however, and we should give credit where
credit is due.  Aristotle already argued that "what is common to the greatest number has the
least care bestowed upon it.  Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, and hardly of the common
interest" (Aristotle, Politics, Book II, chpt. 3).
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another animal to his herd.  And another, and another… But this is
the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing
a commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world
that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the
freedom of the commons.  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all
(Hardin 1968, p. 1244).
Even before Hardin, Gordon (1954) analysed the collective action problems
associated with a fishing ground.  He found that a lack of cooperation among
fishermen results in higher expenditures of effort, higher fish landings, and a
lower continuing fish population than the optimal level.  Similar analyses have
been conducted by a number of scholars (Sandler 1992).  The traditional
economic argument thus predicts that an absence of (private) property rights
will lead to overexploitation of environmental resources and, in consequence, to
their degradation or destruction.
3.4.2 Limits of the Traditional Economic Argument
The collective action and tragedy of the commons arguments are not without
weaknesses, and scholars criticize them for their narrowness of perspective.  In
addition, scholars have gathered extensive empirical evidence against the
necessary link between common property resources and collective failure.10
Thus, Ostrom has argued that Hardin's argument about the tragedy of the
commons refers to open-access resources, but not common property
resources.  She and her colleagues at Bloomington have conducted numerous
analyses identifying determinants of successful cooperation among
appropriators from common property resources, providing for a sustainable
management of these resources.
Substantial criticism of the tragedy of the commons argument also comes from
developments in game theory.  Ostrom (1990), for instance, points out that that
isolation and the lack of communication as the determinative factors underlying
the simple analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the game generally used to
demonstrate the tragedy of the commons, are absent in many real-life situations
in which people depend on a common resource.  Other critics highlight that
numerous other factors such as the technology of public supply11, the pay-off
structure, length of the game, the modelling of cooperation and defection as a
continuous variable, and institutional rules have an impact on outcomes,
allowing results other than the "tragedy of the commons" (Sandler 1992).
                                           
10 For the most extensive selection of cases and literature see the data bases maintained by the
International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) and the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, Bloomington.
11 The technology of public supply captures how individual contributions add to the total public
supply achieved.  The most common technology defined by Sandler (1992) is that of
summation: Q = sum qi, where qi is the collective good's provision level of individual i.
Alternative technologies are those of the weakest link: Q = min (q1, …., qn), and the best shot
technology: Q = max (q1, …, qn).
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Ultimately, the slightest variations in the cost-benefit constellations combined
with different technologies of public supply can lead to different collective action
outcomes.
The most fundamental criticism to the traditional argument for property rights in
environmental management, however, results from its implicit assumptions
about economic and environmental values of resources.  This criticism is
particularly powerful as it stays within the economic logic adopted by the
proponents of the "tragedy of the commons" argument, and therefore
challenges them on their own turf. After all, under the assumption of homo
oeconomicus, the control over natural resources provided by property rights will
only lead to an environmentally superior management of the resource, if the
greatest economic benefit to be derived from the resource results from its
environmentally desirable use.  The following example illustrates this dynamic:
Imagine that there are two fishing ponds, one in Northern Norway and the other
in the middle of Paris.  Both are owned by individual private owners.  In the
case of the Norwegian pond, it is likely, that fishing is the best use to which the
owner can put the pond.  Therefore, the owner is likely to only harvest fish from
the pond to the extend that a sustainable fishing populations remains, to ensure
long-term maximum benefits from the pond.  In the case of the Parisian pond,
however, the best (economic) use the owner can make is to drain the pond and
sell the real estate to a developer for a few billion French Franc.12  Obviously,
there is a difference in conditions between these two ponds.
This difference in conditions is the relationship between the "economic value"
and the "environmental value" of the ponds, the e-e gap as a shorthand (Fuchs
1997).  The e-e gap is an important and frequently overlooked factor influencing
the environmental implications of different property arrangements (it is also of
fundamental importance in determining the necessary extent of
government/policy intervention in private property rights, which is why we will
return to this concept in chapter 6).  Please note that in the context of this
argument, "economic value" refers to the maximum long-term economic value
to be obtained from any use of the resource.  In contrast, "environmental value"
refers to the economic value that can be obtained from the environmentally
most desirable use of the resource.  The difference between these two values is
the e-e gap.
The e-e gap is important for the environmental desirability of property rights and
arrangements because it determines the implications of the maximization of
expected (economic) utility for environmental stewardship.  If economic and
environmental values of a resource are close, the decision maker's
maximization of expected utility can imply a maximization of environmental
stewardship, and therefore the most efficient property regime in economic terms
                                           
12 Note that this argument only applies if we conceive of the owner as "homo oeconomicus"
rather than "homo oecologicus."  This assumption can not always be made, of course,
especially when it comes to environmental values.  Experience shows, however, that there a
limits to the guidance in decision making provided by personal convictions and norms of
behaviour: "Empirical evidence suggests that the price we are willing to pay for our convictions
is a negatively sloped function, so that ideological attitudes are less important as the price
increases; but both the slope of the function and shifts in the functions are subjects about which
we now very little" (North 1989, p. 1322).
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may also be the most desirable one environmentally, i.e. lead to the least
environmental overexploitation or degradation.  If, however, the difference
between the two values is large, the maximization of expected utility is likely to
result in the maximization of environmental degradation, and therefore the
economically most desirable property regime will not be the environmentally
most desirable one.
The e-e gap is a function of market prices, as these determine both the
maximum economic value derivable from a resource, as well as the economic
return on its environmentally desirable use.  Besides market prices,
characteristics of a resource, such as annual growth rates relative to the current
interest rate influence the e-e gap.  As the interest rate indicates the prevailing
return on investment, it highlights the opportunity costs involved in a restraint on
harvest.  Clark (1973) has shown for whales, and Berkes (1996) convincingly
argues that the same dynamic applies to redwoods, that for slow growing
species economic rationality does not lead to sustainable harvest rates.
The e-e gap thus highlights the limits of the traditional argument for (private)
property rights.  Recall, that advocates of private property rights argue that the
high level of individual control and responsibility provided by private property
rights leads to low levels of collective action problems and consequently less
economic and environmental waste.  As the above discussion shows, economic
and environmental waste (or if put in positive terms, economic efficiency and
environmental desirability) are not always closely correlated.  Only if the e-e
gap is small, does greater individual control imply superior environmental
stewardship.  In cases in which the e-e gap is large, greater individual control
implies a greater potential for an economically efficient environmental
degradation of the resource.
3.5 Types of Property Rights
Some scholars suggest that it is useful to differentiate between different types
of property rights, especially as an analytical framework for studying property
arrangements in the context of environmental resources.  Thus, Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) develop a categorization of rights that ranges from access and
withdrawal rights (use rights) to management rights.  They argue that it is
important to distinguish between owners, appropriators, claimants, and
authorized users of a resource (see Table 1).13  Schlager and Ostrom base this
schema on a differentiation between operational level rights of access and
withdrawal and more powerful collective choice rights of management,
exclusion and alienation.  Such a conceptual schema of distinguishing among
rights allows to capture the harvesting and investment incentives better than the
traditional differentiation between private property, common property and open-
access.  Schlager and Ostrom point out that the five types of rights are
independent, but frequently held in the cumulative manner described below (at
least with respect to fisheries, to which they apply this conceptual schema).
                                           
13 In addition, one can talk about the final beneficiaries from the resource, i.e. the consumer of
the final product.  In the context of our project, however, such a focus appears less important.
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Authorized Users
In Schlager and Ostrom's typology, authorized users are individuals holding
rights of access and withdrawal.  Sometimes these rights can be transferred to
others either temporarily or permanently.  Rights of withdrawal and access, in
turn, are defined as the right to enter a defined physical property and the right to
obtain the "products" of the resource.  These rights thus are similar to what our
project proposal calls use rights.  According to Schlager and Ostrom, authorized
users have little incentive to invest in efficient resource management, and are
likely to seek to gain as much as possible with inefficient outcomes being the
likely result.
Claimants
Claimants, in turn, possess the collective choice rights of management in
addition to access and withdrawal rights.  Thus, they can design operational
level rights of withdrawal.14  According to Schlager and Ostrom's typology,
claimants cannot, however, design rights of access to resources.  In
consequence, claimants have some incentives to invest in governance
structures for their resources.  Given a lack of assurance that rewards for their
investments will not be captured by others, however, such  investments are
highly context dependent.  Schlager and Ostrom argue that claimants are most
likely to invest in resources which are not being utilized by any other group,
due, for instance, to a lack of interest or physical accessibility.
Proprietors
In contrast to claimants, proprietors have the right of exclusion (in addition to
operational level rights of access and withdrawal and collective choice rights of
management).  Thus, proprietors have the authority to decide who may access
resources, and how these resources may be utilized.  Rights of exclusion
provide proprietors with substantial incentives to make "current" investments in
resources, as they allow them to be "reasonably assured of being rewarded for
incurring the costs of investment" (op. cit., p. 257).
Owners
Finally, owners hold the collective choice right of alienation, i.e. the right to sell
or lease their collective choice rights, in addition to rights of access and
withdrawal, management and exclusion, according to Schlager and Ostrom's
schema.  Schlager and Ostrom argue for the importance of rights of alienation
                                           
14 In our view, maintenance, monitoring and control, and conflict regulation belong to
management rights.
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for the efficient use of resources, as they provide incentives - if combined with
rights of exclusion - for owners to make long-term  investments in a resource.15
Ownership rights thus come closest to what traditional economic analysis
considered as private property rights, in that they provide owners with the
expectation that they can capture the benefits of long-term investments in a
resource.16  They do not, however, as Schlager and Ostrom point out (and as
we saw above) guarantee the survival of a resource in the context of relatively
high discount rates.
TABLE 1:




Access + Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
De jure versus de facto
Schlager and Ostrom further differentiate between de jure and de facto rights.
They consider de jure rights to be rights that "may be enforced by a government
whose officials explicitly grant such rights to resource users,… [so] that they are
given lawful recognition by formal, legal instrumentalities" (op. cit., p. 254).  In
contrast, de facto property rights are considered to originate among resources
users: "such rights are de facto as long as they are not recognized by
government authorities" (ibid.).  This differentiation between de facto and de
jure property rights highlights the importance of assurance of property rights by
the state, as one condition for de jure property rights to effectively exist and to
determine (environmental) outcomes (see also Fuchs 1996).  Schlager and
Ostrom acknowledge that with respect to a single common pool resource "a
conglomeration of de jure and de facto property rights may exist, which overlap,
complement, or even conflict with one another" (ibid.).
The strength of Schlager and Ostrom's categorization of types of property rights
is that it allows to capture differences in the security of property rights and
therefore differences in incentives to manage resources efficiently.  Critics of
this categorization, however, will point out that it does just that: highlight the
difference that expectations (about the ability to capture rewards for investment)
make in the efficient management of resources and add nothing to what
economists have been pointing out all along.  This criticism is especially
powerful since the types of rights identified by Schlager and Ostrom may differ
                                           
15 Recall that a sustainable harvest rate is a kind of investment, as it means sacrificing today's
consumption for tomorrow's consumption.
16 Ownership also comes closest to what our project proposal considers as property right or
title.
17 Source: Schlager and Ostrom 1992.
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greatly within their individual categories.  Thus, it will be of great importance for
management and exclusion rights, whether they are given for life or until the
owner decides differently.  Likewise, it will make a substantial difference for
ownership rights, if the owner has signed over management and exclusion
rights to a proprietor for a substantial period of time, as ownership rights in that
case have no bearing on the efficient management of the resource.
Schlager and Ostrom themselves raise doubts about the importance of the
different types of rights with their differentiation between de facto and de jure
rights.  Indeed, they find that de facto rights of authorized users might lead to a
more efficient management of a resource than de jure rights of proprietors.18
Thus, economists would claim the legal definition and reach of rights matters
little.  Only expectations about returns and resulting incentives matter, which
may be influenced by the legal context.  The question, thus, is whether
Schlager and Ostrom's categorization really allows us to capture the differences
in expectations and incentives in most cases.
An additional weakness arises from the focus on the efficiency of resource
management in Schlager and Ostrom's argument.  As pointed out above,
(economically) efficient resource management often does not mean sustainable
resource management.  Schlager and Ostrom, however, fail to consider
situations in which a large e-e-gap exists.  In sum, the usefulness of this
categorization of rights for the purposes of our project needs to be further
discussed.
                                           
18 An additional weakness, here, arises from the potential difficulty to differentiate between de
facto and de jure in traditional societies.
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4 Public governance patterns and their elements
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a model of ‘governance’ as an aid for comparing
governance patterns and applies it to a particular policy arena: policies on the
management of water resources. When we use the term ‘governance’ here, we
intend to restrict ourselves to ‘public governance’, since self-steering, e.g. on
the basis of a certain model of property rights, is dealt with in another part of the
model. On the other hand, the concept of ‘public governance’ is wider than just
government intervention, since all kinds of external interventions for a collective
purpose, other than self interest, can provide forms of public governance. In
practice though, public governance usually will imply participation or even
dominance of one or more government bodies.
Various current approaches in policy science focus on changes in
government policy when making comparisons (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993,
1999; Baumgartner & Jones 1993). This chapter does not only try to develop a
model which can be used to focus on (long-term) changes in policy (diachronic
study) but also to compare policies in a certain sector in different areas
(synchronic study). As far as developments in time are described, this is
primarily intended to provide indications of the relationships between the
various elements of the governance pattern and between the governance
pattern and the property rights regulative system.
The model is concerned less with interaction processes (activities and
interactions between actors) than with the more structural elements of
governance, which form both the inputs and outputs of such policy processes.
The research questions examined by this chapter are:
1. Which elements make up a public governance pattern?
2. In what ways do these elements influence each other?
Policy and ‘governance’
In recent decades, there have been many developments in the way we think of
the concept of government policy. One reason for these changes in the way we
view government policy in recent years is that more attention has been given to
the fact that developments in different sectors of society are guided not only by
government but are a result of an interplay between many actors. Within such
networks of actors, government may have a more or less central and dominant
position, or it may not. This means that attention is shifting from government
policy – or ‘government’ – to ‘governance’. In addition, there is also greater
recognition of the fact that sectors of society are not managed at one level or at
different levels separately, but by an interplay between these different levels.
These levels might coincide with different tiers of government, but this does not
need to be the case if there are powerful non-governmental actors that provide
direction at a specific level without there being a government body active at that
level. Also, it is quite possible that the same actors take initiatives at various
levels, sometimes even simultaneously. This process is known as ‘multilevel
governance’.
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4.2 Visions and synthesis
4.2.1 Introduction
In this part of the chapter, we will try to develop as complete a model as
possible of the elements of a ‘public governance pattern’. Later, using this
model, we can compare the governance patterns and the changes they
undergo and the effects they have on property rights and the sustainability of
water resource management. We develop this model through a synthesis of
policy science approaches, and the different emphases in various approaches
each have a place in the model. When developing the model we start from the
concept of ‘policy’, which we build up using the various elements until we arrive
at a ‘public governance pattern’.
In the synthesis that is made here, we do not start with the policy
process but with the context and content of government policy. But what is
context and what is content is not so easy to establish. The perception of the
problem, for example, may be considered to be a part of the policy or a part of
the context; it all depends on how narrow or broad one’s conception of policy is.
We choose to view policy in the broadest sense. The consequence of this
approach is that, on the one hand, all elements of the governance pattern can
be accommodated in the scheme (but not the activities and interactions that are
part of the process of governance itself), while, on the other hand, we can
assume that there are relationships between all these elements (and not just
between elements of the context and elements of the content of policy). All the
identified elements are part of the content of policy and all are a part of the
context of each other. In the following sections, we identify the various elements
of the governance model and then turn to examining the relationships between
them.
A definition of government policy much used in the Netherlands, and which we
use as a starting point, is that of Hoogerwerf (1998: 23). He describes policy (as
a synonym for the content of policy) as: ‘attempting to achieve a particular
objective using particular means at particular times’. Thinking in terms of
objectives and means is considered by him to be the basic structure of every
policy. The term ‘means’ is considered to be a synonym for instruments.
This premise will be further developed using various policy science
approaches. Of course, many of these approaches have other purposes than
identifying elements of the content of policy and governance. For example, they
may be used to explain long-term policy changes, or the effectiveness of policy
instruments. It is not the intention of our discussion to do justice to the
approaches in their own right; what we want to do here is use these approaches
as sources of inspiration for our goal of building as complete a model as
possible of governance patterns.
Moreover, an ‘injustice’ will be done to most approaches in the sense
that they will not be left intact, but only the most specific features highlighted.
Aspects that are also to be found in other approaches and that generally tend to
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soften the bias in these specific features in a certain approach are not treated.
The intention is not to judge these approaches but to enrich our approach to
‘public governance’ in the light of the wealth of aspects brought to light by the
policy science approaches examined.
4.2.2  The stage model of the policy cycle
In the stage model of the policy cycle, the policy process is divided into a
number of subprocesses, such as political agenda-setting, policy preparation,
policy determination, policy implementation and policy evaluation and feedback.
This could provide a useful basis for analysing the content of policy as, in
principle, each stage produces an ‘intermediate product’ (in turn: points of
particular interest, proposals, decisions, applications, results and lessons),
which will eventually lead to the complete policy content. Nevertheless, we will
not use these assumed intermediate products as elements.
The classical stage model of the policy cycle raises the question of the
extent to which such subprocesses are only analytical constructs or whether
they can also be identified in real life. Setting political agendas can be
considered to be an aspect that is present in all policy processes. The same
can be said for evaluation. Feedback consists of shorter and longer loops that
lead to repetition in an altered form of other subprocesses, and so this is also
not a subprocess in its own right. In short: if we are to use ‘real life’ processes,
then setting agendas, evaluation and feedback are possibly not separate
subprocesses of the policy cycle. Policy preparation and policy determination
are in day-to-day empirical practice often also so closely related that it is usually
not worthwhile analysing them as separate processes.
This leaves just two policy processes from the traditional policy cycle:
policy development and policy implementation. But where does this leave the
succession of many administrative levels? (In climate policy, for example, these
are the global, EU and national levels, and sometimes the provincial and local
levels.) What is policy implementation for one level, is policy development for
the next level. In principle, it is possible to make an analytical distinction
between policy development processes and policy implementation processes
that can be useful for analysing these processes. In doing this, policy
development processes are processes that involve turning diffuse inputs into a
more focused output, and policy implementation processes are processes that
involve turning a more or less focused input (the ‘policy’) into a number of
diffuse outputs. When looked at this way, though, making a distinction between
policy development and policy implementation means that the analyst must first
specify himself what this focused output–input is.
Whether policy development and policy implementation are different
processes depends on the question of whether there is a separate arena
(playing field), an separate game that can reasonably be distinguished from
others, and a largely non-overlapping group of actors involved. In other words,
this is an empirical question. The answer will sometimes give cause to draw a
distinction between policy development and implementation processes and
sometimes not, depending on the goal of the research (cf. DeLeon 1999).
The above is not much help for our purposes, though. It would seem to
be sensible not to view the division of the policy process into subprocesses as a
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matter of fact but as an empirical question. In many cases only a distinction
between the process of developing and implementing the content of a policy as
specified by the analyst will hold water. A listing of possible intermediate
products is unsuitable as a basis for a model of the content of policy and
governance.
4.2.3  Interaction processes and instrument theory
An elaboration of thinking in terms of policy processes is to emphasize the
character of these processes as social interaction processes, as has been the
case in the Twente policy sciences approach. Here, attention has shifted from
viewing policy as a sort of production process with semi-finished products and
an end product to a vision in which the actors participating in the process are
the central concern. In this vision, the course and outcomes of the processes
depend not only on the inputs to the process but mainly on the characteristics of
the actors involved, particularly their objectives, information and power. All other
factors that influence the process do so because, and in so far as, they
influence the characteristics of the actors involved. This also applies to the
influence of policy instruments. Not all characteristics of actors, however, are
determined by policy, and so it is not possible to describe a policy without
paying attention to the actors involved in that policy. These actors are,
therefore, allocated a place in a graphic model of the policy (Bressers, 1983).
Moreover, the processes in this vision are not only linked in one series or
cycle, but are part of a large number of societal processes in which government
authorities sometimes participate and sometimes do not. All these processes
are connected to other processes in a complicated web via their inputs and
outputs, and possibly indirectly linked to all other processes. Each definition of a
sector of society draws a more or less arbitrary boundary round a cluster of
processes in this web. In practice, the boundaries that are drawn between
policy development and policy implementation are the same as those between
a higher and lower administrative levels of government (Bressers 1983;
Honigh 1985; Bressers & Honigh 1986).
The ‘instrument theory’ which stems from this perspective focuses on the
application and effects of instruments on the target groups of policy (Bressers &
Klok 1987; Bressers, Klok, Kuks & Lulofs 1988; Klok 1991). It also takes
account of the fact that instruments do not influence the characteristics of the
actors involved separately but rather as a package or as an ‘instrument
strategy’. Instruments and strategies have various properties, for example a
certain proportionality between target group behaviour and government reaction
to this behaviour, or giving resources to the target group or taking these
resources away from the target group. Such properties of instrument strategies
affect their applicability in practice. Klok emphasizes that some of the
instruments are designed to give those implementing the policy the power to
apply other instruments (Klok 1991: 176-194) and also that the implementing
organizations depend on being equipped with sufficient capacity and expertise
(idem: 163-164; see also Bressers 1983: 218-237 and 256-274). In his thesis,
Arentsen (1991) exhaustively discusses the relation between the policy
organization and policy implementation. So also the organization of
implementation is important.
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Later publications on this approach (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Bressers
1993; Bressers, O’Toole & Richardson 1994; Bressers, Huitema & Kuks 1994)
have paid more attention to the interrelations between the actors, including
actors that do not directly participate in the processes under examination. Klok
(1995) gives primary importance to the allocation and removal of resources in
such contexts and in the classification of policy instruments. The mutual
relationships between actors within such policy networks are seen as an
important factor in the development of the content of policy (Ligteringen 1999).
In addition, the relation between policy processes at the various administrative
levels is explicitly dealt with (Bressers, Kuks & Ligteringen 1998). During this
theoretical development, the approach to policy as an interactive process and
the instrument theory based on this gradually grew into an integrative policy
science approach, uniting elements from a variety of other approaches.
This discussion brings us to the following provisional elements of public
governance: (1) administrative levels, (2) actors in the policy network, (3)
objectives, (4) strategies and instruments, and (5) organization of
implementation.
From this starting point, we examined what modifications to this elementary
public governance model are to be made.  First, we take a few other integrative
policy science approaches into consideration: Ostrom’s institutional approach
and Sabatier’s ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6) and
thereafter turn to a wider range of policy science approaches (section 4.2.7).
First, in the section 4.2.4, we will present the conclusions derived from these
exercises.
4.2.4 A model of governance in five elements
Based on the consideration of the various policy sciences approaches, no
completely new elements will be added to the model of governance. But is
should be possible to improve on the five elements and make them operational.
For instance, the scale aspect will be de-coupled from tiers of government,
since a truly multilevel governance pattern is not tied to specific governmental
organizations. Similarly, a much wider notion of problem perception will replace
policy objectives, and so on.
In its shortest form the ‘governance model’ consists of five questions:
Where? Who? What? How? and With what? A characteristic feature of modern
‘governance’ systems is that they have many aspects. They are: multilevel,
multi-actor, multifaceted, multi-instrumental and multi-resource-based. The
questions mentioned under each heading operationalise the contents and
meaning of the element.
(1) Levels and scales of governance
Where? – multilevel –
Which levels of governance dominate policy and the debate on conducting
policy, and in which relation? What is the relation with the administrative levels
of government? Who decides or influences such issues? How is the interaction
between the various administrative levels arranged?
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(2) Actors in the policy network
Who? – multi-actor –
How open is the policy arena in theory and practice, and to whom? Who is
actually involved and with what exactly? What is their position? What is the
accepted role for government? Who has relevant ownership and use rights or is
a stakeholder in some other capacity (including policy implementing
organizations)? What is the structural inclination to cooperate among actors in
the network? Are there actors among them who operate as process brokers or
‘policy entrepreneurs’? What is the position of the general public versus experts
versus politicians?
(3) Problem perception and objectives
What – multifaceted –
What are the dominant maps of reality? What is seen as a problem and how
serious is this considered to be? What do people see as the causes of this
problem? Is the problem considered to be a problem for individuals or a
problem for society as a whole? What values and other preferences are
considered to be at stake? Which functions are allocated to the sector? Is the
problem seen as a relatively new and challenging topic or as a topic in the
‘management’ phase without much political ‘salience’? To what degree is
uncertainty accepted? Where are the recognized points of intervention? What
relationships with other policies fields are recognized as coordination topics?
Which policy objectives are accepted? What are the levels to which policy
makers aspire (ambition) in absolute terms (level of standards) and relative
terms (required changes in society)?
(4) Strategy and instruments
How? – multi-instrumental –
Which instruments belong to the policy strategy? What are the characteristics of
these instruments? What are the target groups of the policy and what is the
timing of its application? How much flexibility do the instruments provide? To
what extent are multiple and indirect routes of action used? Are changes in the
ownership and use rights within the sector anticipated? To what extent do they
provide incentives to ‘learn’? What requirements do they place on the
availability of resources for implementation?19 How are the costs and benefits of
the policy distributed?
(5) Responsibilities and resources for implementation
With what? – multi-resource-based –
Which organizations (including government organizations) are responsible for
implementing the policy?  What is the repertoire of standard reactions to
challenges known to these organizations? What authority and other resources
are made available to these organizations by the policy? With what restrictions?
                                           
19 For example, some systems of emission charges or tradable licences may require so much
information that it makes them almost impossible to apply. The fine tuning of the instrument is
very important in this respect, and can make the difference between an effective intervention
and a dead end.
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The next sections discuss a range of policy science approaches and highlight
the aspects derived from these approaches to enrich our governance model.
4.2.5 The ‘institutional rational choice approach’
Ostrom’s institutional model is in essence a ‘rule-based’ approach. Although in
later work (for example Ostrom 1999) attention is also paid to the
characteristics of the actors themselves and the physical conditions as the
context of the processes, the distinguishing feature of the approach is that
collections of rules are used to describe the ‘action arena’ in which such
processes take place.
Ostrom (1999: 52-53) distinguishes seven different types of rules which
together define the arena: ‘entry and exit’ rules that determine who may take up
a position between the actors and who may not; ‘position’ rules that determine
which position these actors have in the network; ‘scope’ rules that state the field
to which this position relates; ‘authority’ rules that indicate the competences of
the actors as experienced by themselves; ‘aggregation’ rules that state for
certain actions, in the experience of the actors, whether permission from others
is required or not; ‘information’ rules that state what is known and to whom and
how this information is disseminated – for example whether information must
remain secret or whether it should be made public; and ‘payoff’ rules that state
what the benefits or sanctions are for the various actors and how these are
arrived at (for example, regarding compliance with or infringement of rules, who
checks compliance and imposes sanctions, and how). These categories appear
to partly overlap (Heilman 1992: 81). Nevertheless, they can enrich the
elements of governance we have identified.
This applies in particular to the element ‘networks and actors’. In the
instrument theory the composition and position of the actors involved in the
network is assumed to be a given fact. The first two types of rules require that
attention is given to the fact that these are crucial variables.  A similar situation
applies to the ‘scope’ rules that determine the extent of certain positions,
competences and other sources of power. For that matter, when applying the
model many of these rules are related to the allocation of ownership and use
rights between those involved (Ostrom 1990).
An interesting fact is that a few times it is explicitly stated that it is not the
‘objective’ rules that describe the actual arena but the way in which these are
experienced in the eyes of those involved. Something similar is emphasized by
listing the ‘information’ rules as separate entities, which also require that
particular attention be paid to the limitations of the available information.
Incidentally, a parallel can be drawn between the last four types of rules and the
three characteristics of power (2x), information and objectives from the
instrument theory. The difference always lies in the fact that these are not
described as characteristics of the actors involved but of the rules of the game
for each situation. Besides institutional arrangements, Ostrom also recognizes
‘characteristics of the community’ and ‘events and the nature of the goods (for
example groundwater and the physical features of the aquifers) as influencing
the choice situation (Kiser & Ostrom 1982; Sabatier 1991).
Another aspect of Ostrom’s approach is that she makes a distinction
between the different levels of analysis. Rules that influence ‘operational’
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situations such as production and consumption are made at a higher or deeper
level of ‘collective choice situations’. The creation of these rules is, in turn,
subject to ‘constitutional’ rules, etc. This layered structure of the rule context is
not the same as a classification of administrative layers. After all, constitutional
rules apply to all administrative layers and collective choice situations arise at
each administrative level. This structure developed by Ostrom accentuates the
fact that action arenas are ‘nested’ in the rules that are set by other arenas,
independently of the question of whether this takes place in another
administrative layer. On the other hand, such administrative layers are usually
established to create just such a context for policy processes at ‘lower’ levels.
Moreover, the analytical separation between the various types of rules appears
difficult to differentiate in practice. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the
application of policy instruments is part of the operational level or part of the
collective level.
A compromise between both interpretations of the term ‘level’ could be –
as in the introduction to this section – to speak about levels within a concept of
‘multilevel governance’, in which the other level often, but not always, and not
by definition, also has its own characteristic administrative level.
4.2.5  The ‘advocacy coalition framework’
The ‘advocacy coalition framework’ developed by Sabatier and others was
developed as an answer to the stage model of the policy cycle and to better
understand the relation between ‘technical information’ (expert knowledge) and
the policy process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 117). An ‘advocacy
coalition’ is a collection of actors from both within and outside government who
hold common beliefs and who coordinate their activities to a considerable
degree (Sabatier 1988, 1991). Within a sector of policy – the ‘political
subsystem’ – there is usually more than one advocacy coalition active. In
addition, there are actors who are more likely to have objectives that relate to
policy processes than to the content of policy, and these actors are referred to
by Sabatier as political brokers. The characteristic features of coalitions are
their political convictions or ‘policy beliefs’ and the resources they have, which
lead to the proposed strategy and instruments of the coalition. The decisions
that result from the policy process provide implementing organizations with both
policy lines and resources. The actors in the subsystem are influenced by
resources and restrictions from outside the subsystem, which in turn arise out of
more or less stable conditions and events elsewhere in the system.
In the development of the model much more attention has generally
been paid to the aspect of policy beliefs than to the aspect of resources. Only
recently have Fenger & Klok (1998) developed a connection between the model
and resource dependence, which has been enthusiastically received by
Sabatier (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 141). For our purposes, it is important
that the allocation of resources to the implementing organizations is explicitly
recognized to be part of the policy decision. Besides that, what is of particular
importance is the idea that there are coalitions of actors in the policy network
that do not just simply represent the division between government and other
actors, but contain actors from both of these groups and are based on common
beliefs.
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Regarding the beliefs of actors, we can identify various layers. In the
‘deep core’ are issues relating to fundamental values. The ‘policy core’ contains
positions relating to the perception of problems, the division of the costs of
policy implementation, the desirability of contributions from experts, politicians
and the general public and other relevant values and preferences. The ‘derived
aspects’ contain elaborations for each given situation. Besides this layered
structure what is also important to us is the importance that is attached to the
perception of the problem.
The next section reviews a few other approaches, which may be seen partly as
precursors to the perspectives examined above. The discussion will
concentrate on aspects that can be used to improve on the operationalization of
the five elements, asking ourselves each time whether the approach can really
contribute something extra to the model.
4.2.7  Some other approaches
Synoptic rationality, bounded rationality, incrementalism and mixed scanning
(Simon, Lindblom, Etzioni)
It may be strange to begin this treatment of a series of approaches with one that
we describe mainly in order to reject it, namely the approach based on fully
rational choice. In particular, the premises that the decision maker has
unambiguous preferences and complete information are invalid.
It was the Nobel prize winner for economics Herbert A. Simon (1997
(1945)) who provided the most famous criticism of these premises. His view of
mankind is not that of an all-knowing ‘Homo oeconomicus’ with clear and
confident preferences, but of a being with ‘bounded rationality’. While the
concept of rational decision making only refers to the decision making process
itself, and not the context, ‘bounded rationality’ takes account of the limitations
in the capacity of actors to collect and process information.
Lindblom’s ‘incrementalism’ (Lindblom 1959; Braybrooke & Lindblom
1970 (1963)) also assumes a limited human capacity to process information. In
addition, it devotes much attention to the power of continuity (see next section)
and to the character of pluralistic processes geared to political negotiations.
This approach also pays attention to the interaction between ‘values’ and ‘facts’.
The latter feature again, more prominently, in the cognitive approaches, which
are examined at the end of this section.
‘Mixed scanning’ (Etzioni 1967) is primarily meant to be a description of
the process of policy development (either in a normative sense or not). It offers
little extra of relevance to the context of governance. Opening up the
possibilities of non-incremental policy changes has to do, for example, with
‘megapolicy changes’ (cf. Dror 1971). This fits with the previously mentioned
cognitive approaches, for instance, with their frames and maps of reality.
Bureaucracy and politics (Allison)
In his groundbreaking work, Allison (1971) attempts to explain the course of the
Cuban missile crisis in three ways. He, too, starts with the model of the rational
actor, not only to determine his own position but also to provide an initial
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explanation of the process. This allows him to present the added value of
discussing and using the other two explanatory models with extra clarity.
The ‘bureaucracy model’ (following Allison’s example) specifically
addresses the standard approaches and repertoires of organizations, which
restrict flexibility in conducting policy. The model has some aspects in common
with elements of our governance model: it goes into the role of organizations at
various levels; it is also one of the few approaches that explicitly addresses the
organization of implementation. In the construction of objectives, it addresses
the phenomenon of ‘solutions in search of a problem’ (compare the flow model,
examined below), an aversion to risky measures (dealing with uncertainty) and
the organizations’ own management objectives.
The ‘political negotiation’ model (à la Allison) looks at the positions,
interests and mutual power relations between actors (in so far as these do not
relate to the game itself). The reasoning in terms of power in the interaction
process approach (see above) is based on this model.
Flows and garbage cans (Kingdon)
Decision making does not always follow an orderly procedure but sometimes
seems more like a process of fermentation in a compost heap (‘garbage can’
model of Cohen and others 1972), in which various issues come together by
chance. The flow model of the policy process (Kingdon 1995, 1984) builds
further on this and examines how three relatively autonomous flows come
together each time a decision has to be made. Political ‘entrepreneurs’ promote
this by making use of ‘windows of opportunity’ (or creating them). The three
flows consist of problem perceptions, ideas for possible policies and political
‘salience’ for the voters and those elected, and of the people who emphasize
each of these three or parts of them.
It is tempting to link these three flows to our elements ‘beliefs and
objectives’, ‘strategies and instruments’ and ‘actors in the network’. With
respect to this it should be noted that Kingdon considers the three flows more
as notions than as matters of fact (Zahariadis 1999: 74-78) (see also the
subjectivist approaches discussed below). We should also note that where we
emphasize more or less stable features of policy sectors in the governance
model, to allow comparisons to be made between sectors, Kingdon looks
instead at the changeability of these features with regard to individual subjects
of decision making. Nevertheless, the three elements mentioned allow the
issues Kingdon wants to highlight to be accommodated.
Conversely, reasoning from the governance model to the flow model, the
following can be added to the requirements that have to be met if a policy is to
be amended. The convergence of problem perception, policy opportunities and
political salience should not take place at different levels (as, for example, when
there is concern about a problem at the national level while solutions are being
sought at the European level). Moreover, it is necessary that ideas for solutions
include ideas about the management and allocation of tools and resources for
implementation. Otherwise, an issue will lead to a policy decision (and be
thrown out of the ‘open window’ and removed from the political agenda), but
that decision will only result in a symbolic policy.
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Real games (Scharpf)
In his recent overview of policy science approaches, Sabatier (1999) classifies
the game theory of Scharpf (1997) with the institutional rational choice
approach (see above). There is something to be said for this, but still, Scharpf
and his colleagues highlight a few points left out by Ostrom and her group.
Scharpf calls his approach ‘actor centred institutionalism’. Besides links to the
Ostrom approach, it is true that much attention is paid to the ‘actor
constellations’. The goal and structure of the approach appear similar to that of
the instrument theory, namely that the course and outcome of the processes
are explained, but without being specially concerned with one of the five
elements of governance as outcome. The most important difference from the
instrument theory is that the outcome to be explained is related to the question
of whether those involved can cooperate or not, while the instrument theory
mainly tries to explain the relation between inputs and outputs of the policy
process. The explanation takes place primarily in terms of the distribution of
preferences for alternatives. Much attention is also paid to information, but only
to direct information and not so much to frameworks for interpretation (see
below). Further, the approach is based primarily on individual rational actors,
although other values are also taken into account.
Cognitive maps, ‘discourses’, ‘frames’, argumentation and cultures (Axelrod,
Dryzek, Fischer, Schön, Thompson & Wildavsky e/o.)
A large number of current theories in the policy sciences can be characterized
as cognitive approaches. Characteristic for these theories is that they all
emphasize that the behaviour of actors rests on their subjective interpretation of
reality and furthermore that this subjective interpretation is formed because
observations of actors are given a place in frameworks of interpretation that
provide meaning to these observations, but also distort them. Such frameworks
of interpretation can be partially viewed as a form of dealing with uncertainty. To
assume for the analysis that an ‘objective’ context exists, which the researcher
simply assesses, leads in this vision to false analyses, because not the facts
but the interpretations count in reality. So, as a contexts of decision-making, not
the facts but the interpretations are ‘true’. Think of the well known adagio: ‘What
is believed to be real is real in its consequences’.
In the layered ‘policy beliefs’ of Sabatier one finds a partial sentiment of
these theories. That doesn’t mean however that Sabatier has very much
respect for these theories. In his recent work, he assesses some of these as
still too vague to be regarded as a real theory. For this reason, he doesn’t deal
with them in his book (Sabatier 1999: 11). The differences between the various
theories are to be found especially in the way in which the frameworks of
interpretation are conceptualised. In this respect, one can observe a certain
range of foci from more individual to more collective frameworks of
interpretation.
Axelrod (1976) writes about the ‘cognitive maps’ of political elites. For
him, the emphasis of the cognitive map is on those aspects that decision-
makers are able to recognize in a certain situation and on the complex web of
causal relationships that they think are linking these aspects. Because the
various cognitive maps of participants in decision-making processes often do
not match it is hard to find a common ground for the exchange of ideas. Unless
one is able to make the cognitive maps more explicit that is.
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Schön (1983 and Schön & Rein 1994) starts his analysis from the
viewpoint of the professional, who - whether as an actor or as an analyst -
creates an image of the situation. According to Schön, he does so by building a
‘frame’ (as framework of interpretation) in which he can ‘store’ his lessons learnt
about the world and his own repertoire of reactions. In this way, he is able to
react adequately in the numerous situations in which a fundamental and
thorough analysis is impossible. Needed for this is that the ‘frame’ remains
flexible, in other words that new lessons can obtain a place in it and are not
simply kept out, when they threaten to disturb the frame. He calls this process
‘reflection-in-action’. To make effective communication with others possible
sometimes ‘cross frame discourse’ is needed, in which the participants try to
escape the limitations of their own frame and try to learn to understand the
frame of the others in order to better understand their interpretational frames.
Necessary condition is an open societal debate.
Fischer (1985, 1995 and with Forrester 1993) concentrated initially
especially on the various layers of values that play a role in the assessment
process in evaluation. In the layer of the policy goals, one can seek optimal
realization. But it is also possible to criticize the policy goals themselves from
the perspective of general norms that one identifies as relevant to the situation.
In doing so, the role of government itself can become a topic. These norms can
in their turn be judged from the perspective of the central values of society. And
even these can be subject to further evaluation in culture or social critique. In
his later work, emphasis is more on the ‘social construction’ of reality. In other
words: the way in which a society views reality is regarded as a sort of implicit
agreement.
Dryzek (1987, 1997)  views frameworks of interpretation as ‘discourses.'
Characteristic for a discourse is that it is not only a set of points of attention,
assumptions and judgements. The discourse is also linked with specific
language expressions. Because different words and metaphors are used, it is
extra difficult to communicate across borders between discourses. In that way,
discourses can also become both stabilized and rigid.  The frameworks of
interpretation are thus not only ‘social constructions’. They are also a sort of
‘story that we tell each other about how the world works’ (Milbrath 1993).
Thompsom & Wildavsky e/o. (Thompsom, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990,
Schwarz & Thompsom 1990) build upon the cultural anthropologic approach of
Mary Douglas. Their ‘cultural theory’ discerns four (sometimes five) cultural
positions on the basis of two dimensions that represent the relation between the
individual and society: ‘grid’ and ‘group’. A precise explanation of these two
concepts would be too demanding for our purpose, but they have
consequences for the way in which the role of government is judged. The
resulting cultural positions are called ‘biases’ because they induce an inclination
to interpret reality in a certain way. The result is that frameworks of
interpretation in this view are not seen as specific to certain actors in relation to
a certain topic, but in principle as belonging to a fixed attitude of persons,
groups or even societies. Admittedly, in later work, this strong linkage of various
frames of interpretation to one common collective cultural bias has been
relaxed.
For our model (see 4.2.4), the above theories have the consequence that we
will pay attention to access to the societal debate and the acceptance of the
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role of government in the first element of the model. With respect to problem
perception, we should pay attention to the images of reality that act as filters for
the interpretation of observations and to the degree to which uncertainties are
accepted as one of the indicators of the degree to which one is in need of such
images in order to prevent a feeling of uncertainty. With the strategies, it is
important to assess whether the chosen instruments provide incentives to learn,
in other words to change and expand existing images of reality. Often, flexible
instruments and indirect steering methods are used for that purpose.
Now that we have tried to formulate as complete as possible a model of public
governance, we will examine the types of connections that can be expected
between the five elements of the governance pattern.
4.3 Patterns and dynamics
4.3.1 Introduction
In this section, we describe the relationships between the five elements of
governance. The assumed relationships between the five elements described in
this paper are based on the basic principle that the elements of policy each
form the context of the other elements and that they will tend to adjust to each
other.
By choosing mutual adjustment as a basic principle, emphasis is placed
on stability rather than change. Nevertheless, such a model also offers a
framework for explaining change. Changes in the external context of factors
that are not considered to be part of the governance model can influence one or
more of the elements. Through the same mechanisms of mutual interaction, this
can in turn lead to changes in all of the elements of the governance model. This
combination of stability (by convergence in situations without major external
challenges) and dynamics (by the impact of change agents from outside
through one of the elements to the rest of the governance pattern) goes along
well with certain theories on policy change (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 1993,
De Vries 1999).
The idea of mutual adjustment also offers the possibility of explaining
differences between the situations in two or more countries, in this case
differences in governance in the field of water resource management.
Differences in external factors, for example in geological and hydrological
features, or in solidly grounded aspects of governance, for example the
constitutional allocation of competences to government authorities, will,
according to this idea, indirectly bring about a series of differences in (other)
elements of governance.
There is a certain ‘logical’ relation between the five elements of
governance. This, however, means no more than that it is easy to see why each
previous element imposes harder or softer limitations on aspects of the
following element. In this sense, these influences create a situation in which the
elements adjust to suit one another. In our opinion, however, there is no a priori
reason for thinking that influences between the elements are restricted to this
‘logical sequence’ alone. In principle, the idea of mutual adjustment means that
there is every reason to believe that all 25 mutual influences are possible. All
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elements form the context for the others and can therefore be both independent
and dependent variables. Likewise the previous status of an element forms a
context for its later status. All in all, this means that we can distinguish 25
relationships.
4.3.2  Premises and mechanisms
Our expectations about the relationships between the elements of public
governance are based on the following premises and mechanisms.
Main assumption: The influences that the five elements of governance exert on
each other will promote the mutual adjustment of these elements in a
governance system.
Subsidiary assumption: Changes within a governance system occur because
factors ‘from outside’ alter characteristic features of one or more of the five
elements to a greater or lesser extent, and the other elements adjust
themselves to this.
The main assumption rests on three mechanisms. These can be formulated as
secondary assumptions and applied to the formulation of the hypotheses on the
relationships between elements of governance.
Secondary assumption 1: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the tendency towards an increase in the
mutual consistency of the values that play a role in these elements if there are
no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 2: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the requirement that the elements fit into a
common framework for interpretation if there are no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 3: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the dependence of each of these elements
on resources from the other elements.  
Before dealing further with our expectations about the relationships between the
elements of our governance model, we will elaborate upon three perspectives
on decision making that are important for the mechanisms of change (values,
cognitions and resources – to want, to know and to can).
Values, cognitions and resources
Why are objectives, information and power (with values, cognition and
resources in the background) the useful perspectives when examining the
relationships between the five elements of the governance model? As we have
indicated above this has to do with the fact that the relationships between the
elements are brought about by processes of social interaction. These three
perspectives have proven to be exceptionally useful in explaining the dynamics
of such processes. In his thesis, Bressers (1983: 1898-197) attempts to indicate
why these three in particular are essential. He first looks at what is needed to
make a relatively simple object: making a chair requires the carpenter to have
an object in mind, and it requires expertise and resources, such as tools and
materials. In a multiple-actor process, goals also relate to the actor's position
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relative to other actors as well as information and resources (in the form of
power). Bressers also considers the long tradition of thinking about these
perspectives (idem: 352-328).
A second way of clarifying the three perspectives is to link them to ideas on
policy instruments. Policy instruments are often classified into rules, incentives
and communication. This, in our opinion, does not so much reflect different
policy instruments but different ways in which they exert their influence.
Regulations are not always couched in terms of compulsory rules but may also
work by influencing the outcome of balancing the costs and benefits of
alternative patterns of behaviour (incentives) and ensuring that attention is
given to certain alternative forms of behaviour (communication). Subsidies are
not only incentives, but are also linked to conditions (rules) and information
(communication). Communication, certainly two-way communication, often
leads to agreements being made, such as covenants or voluntary agreements
(rules) and the exchange of concessions, for example acceptance of change in
exchange for flexible timing (incentives). In other words, these are aspects of all
policy instruments rather than separate groups of instruments. The fact that the
classification of instruments in terms of rules, incentive based instruments, and
communicative instruments, still remains so important has more to do with their
connections with the general existence of the three perspectives on societal
interaction processes than with their usefulness for this purpose.
A third way of illustrating the rich significance of the three perspectives is to
relate them to social science disciplines. There is a certain connection between
these disciplines and the three perspectives mentioned above. This connection
is partial, though, and relates to the core principles of these disciplines rather
than any details, drawing a distinction in principle between individual and social
methods of consideration.
The fundamental concept in economics is the scarcity of resources and
the decisions and bartering that result from this. In its most classical version,
the complexities of all other aspects (the social, cognitive and value aspects)
are reduced to assumptions of ‘methodological individualism’, ‘complete
information’ and ‘individual behaviour that maximizes benefits’. If ‘benefit’
cannot simply be equated with money, multiple objectives are formulated, for
example ‘bureaucrats strive to obtain as large a budget as possible’. This is, in
essence, an unethical and pragmatic premise. So, to sum up: ‘A: that which
gives the greatest benefit will be chosen.’
In political science, the social aspect of the distribution of resources, and
so the power of one actor over another, are emphasized. Reasoning, then, is
about the question of who is going to dominate the field. To sum up: ‘B:
Whoever has the most power is free to choose.’
Sociology is partly about understanding social problems and psychology
is partly about human skill in collecting and processing information. To sum up:
‘C: It is not the facts that are important, but how what is observed is interpreted.’
(Or: ‘What is believed to be real is real in its consequences.’)
Social psychology and communication science emphasize the transfer of
information in mutual communication processes. Also, the role of information
collection and processing is often emphasized in the process of making choices
and power relations (and of the development of values). The ‘argumentative
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tendency’ in policy sciences (e.g. Hoppe 1999) fits largely into this track. To
sum up: ‘D: Interpretations of reality are the product of social construction.’
The value aspect is pivotal in ethics and other areas of philosophy. To
sum up: ‘E: People should want what is good.’
Regarding normative social aspects, imposing values on others, for
example the whole community, we enter the domain of the law. To sum up: ‘F:
The limits to what is good are set by rules.’
Of course, this characterization of perspectives (and certainly of associated
disciplines) is too simple when forced into a simple matrix. Each scientific
discipline can and does borrow elements from the other cells. In doing so,
though, it is often clear that they reject some of their own principles and
integrate some of the principles of other social sciences into their own set of
considerations.
Scientific Perspectives Individual Social
Resources (power) a. Choosing the greatest
benefit
b. Those with most
power can choose
Cognitions (information) c. It is not the facts that
are important but how
what is observed is
interpreted
d. Interpretations of
reality are the product of
social construction
Values (objectives) e. People should want
what is good
f. The limits to what is
good are set by rules
Table 2: A Sketch of Scientific Perspectives
All in all, the above shows, in our opinion, the value and significance of these
perspectives when a rather complete picture is required of the relationships
between social science concepts, such as the elements of the public
governance system identified by us. A central ‘premise’ is that values,
cognitions and resources are not just a random selection from a number of
more or less equivalent alternative factors, but together more or less cover the
ground. After this account of the power and significance of the three
perspectives used in this paper, we now formulate the expectations regarding
the relationships between the elements of governance that are used in this
study.
4.3.3 Expectations
The expectations that are connected to the specified premises and mechanisms
are the following ones:
(1) The best predictor of the status of an element at t2 is its status at t1. Each
change takes up energy and will not take place if the governance system is in
balance. Only changes in other factors (within and outside the ‘governance
system’ and via the efforts of the actors) can bring about changes. This idea
forms the basis for the five ‘continuation’ relationships, in which an element
influences its own status at a later time.
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(2) The elements in the model mentioned earlier form a more or less limiting or
determining context for later elements. The division of the conduct of policy
between administrative levels activates networks that are active primarily at
these levels. Those participating in these policy networks are, of course, those
who give shape to the perception of the problem and the ambitions in the public
debate and subsequently the policy itself. These, in turn, are the focus of
discussions about policy strategies, for one reason because certain actors are
considered to be a target group while others are not one because certain
intervention points in the policy field are utilized while others are not. The
selected strategies and the instruments that are part of these, in turn, require
the availability of an implementation structure and resources to make
implementation possible (see also footnote 2 in Table 3). These ideas form the
basis for the four ‘logical order’ hypotheses. The five elements form a sort of
cascade of influence.
(3) This ‘logical order’ of influence is not the only way in which (changes in)
elements of the ‘governance cascade’ can influence each other. In fact, we
believe that all the other conceivable 16 relationships are possible, including the
influence of elements mentioned later on elements mentioned earlier. All 25
relationships should be considered, for example to analyse clusters of
differences between policies in certain sectors in two countries or in two
periods. It is possible, after all, that the influence of the ‘network’ on strategy
works via the influence of the former on ‘ambition’, for instance.
(4) The general idea behind all of these relationships is that they promote the
mutual adjustment of elements. Dynamics of change will always have an
external source. These sources may consist of (a) major social developments,
such as demographic, cultural, economic or physical (technological and spatial)
developments, and (b) developments in other policy fields (Ligteringen 1998:
214-215 and following).
To give an example: such an external ‘change agent’ might be a national
policy demanding an increase in sustainably produced energy from domestic
energy producers, which creates pressures to dam a small and locally managed
river for this purpose. So, a new actor will enter the scene. But since his plans
will not necessarily be in accordance with those of other actors, conflict is likely
to arise. Probably, then, the level of national authorities and other national
organizations will demand a say in the affairs, since local opposition may be
perceived as frustrating the specific national policy measure. Problem
perceptions and objectives will not be untouched by these developments.
Etceteras. Ultimately also the property and use rights of the various
stakeholders could be affected.
(5) All these mutual influences do not occur in and of themselves but need
processes of social interaction to bring them about. In the description of the
governance system here, however, we do not explore further the process side
of the system, but only go into the elements that are (re)produced by these
processes (as outputs of processes) and which, in turn, again form a context for
other processes (as inputs to processes). By accepting that the relationships
between the elements actually work through processes of social interaction we
can best explore the assumed relationships on the basis of what we see as the
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central factors in such processes (Bressers 1983; Bressers & Klok 1987a,
1987b; Kuks 1987; Klok 1991).
(6) An adjustment may take place along three possible perspectives, referring
to: objectives (‘desire’, ultimate basis: values), information (‘knowledge’,
ultimate basis: cognition) and power (‘ability’, ultimate basis: resources). The
mechanism of mutual adjustment, distributed over the five elements of the
governance system, will tend to make values consistent, to make cognitions fit
better into a common framework for interpretation, and to make resources act to
mutually facilitate the elements. But take note: just as in expectations 1 and 2,
these are not compulsory determinants but probabilistic influences, taken for
the moment to be preliminary working hypotheses. In essence, the influences
also play a role in the ‘logical order’ of the elements in the model.
The assumptions and the expectations that are based on these assumptions
are informative and not tautological because, in the first place, it is conceivable
that ‘disturbances from outside’ are so numerous nowadays that the tendencies
listed are not recognizable in the empirical data, even when they are, in
principle, not incorrect. In the second place, the core ideas can also be
questioned, for example from a ‘post-modern’ perspective in which the
autonomous tendency towards fragmentation and coexistence of values and
cognition is emphasized.
The expectations are testable because the mutual relationships between
the elements, both in comparisons between cases and comparisons in time,
can be mapped and can be compared with what is to be expected according to
the general expectations. For that, it is necessary to specify the expected
relationships between the elements along all three lines of reasoning
(mechanisms). This has been done (Kuks and Bressers, 2000: 23-28), but we
will not present this specification here for lack of space.
To conclude this section, we present the twenty-five relationships for reasons of
overview in one single scheme. The cells are filled with very short descriptions
that are meant to provide a single key indicator of the nature of the expected
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Table 3: The five elements of governance and the relationships between them
This scheme of relationships between the five elements of our governance
model will be used to analyse the differences between the various countries
and cases within these countries regarding their water resource management.
A further elaboration of this scheme is presented as part of the ‘Case study
protocol’ in appendix 3.
Although theoretical expectations have been formulated in this chapter, it is not
this set of expectations that is the core of the EUWARENESS research topic.
The expectations presented are relevant because they show HOW change in
governance patterns takes place. But they do not answer the questions why
and when change takes place, and what direction changes will take. Thus, we
need to pay extra attention to theorems that explain how external influences set
change in motion and how such changes are related to the complexity and
integration of water resource management. This will be the topic of the next
chapter.
                                           
20 Compare for instance ‘sustainability’ and ‘residential environmental quality’
(leefomgevingskwaliteit).
21 Which means both extra openess for some and closedness for others.
22 Cf. Bressers 1998, Bressers & O’Toole 1998, Ligteringen 1999.
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5 The transformation of regimes
5.1 Introduction
One of the central questions the EUWARENESS project is focused on, reads
literally in the proposal: “Which political conditions give rise to sustainable water
resources regimes and how do they affect their evolution?”
Already the research proposal itself showed that our interest is
somewhat broader in this respect. First, as for the evolution of regimes our main
attention is to the transformation from complex into more integrated regimes,
under the assumption (to be tested as a hypothesis elsewhere) that more
integrated regimes tend to be more sustainable. But other regime changes,
from none to simple and from simple to complex are also paid attention to,
especially in the longitudinal ‘country screening’ phase of the research.
Secondly, the relevant factors affecting these changes are not
necessarily restricted to ‘political conditions’, unless their ‘political’ nature would
be derived from the fact that they seem to influence political constellations like
resource management regimes. Thus, a more open formulation of the question
could be: “What are the factors or constellations of factors that explain the
gradual evolution or regime shifts of water resources regimes?”
In elaborating the theoretical background for studying this research question,
we should bear the users perspective of the European Union in mind. From this
perspective, “the research focus should be on applied socio-economics aimed
at assessing how to induce technological, managerial and organisational
changes, especially where traditional approaches to water management
prevail.” This means that not only the fact of regime change counts, but also the
consequences of these changes in terms of a more sustainable resource use.
5.2 Analysis of the theoretical framework of the research proposal
In the research proposal, the transformation of regimes is dealt with in two
places. Firstly, assumptions about regime change are inherent in figure 1 and
its graphical representation of regime development in relation to demand for the
resource and time. The underlying hypothesised typical history of regime
evolution includes the following phases: no regime; discovery of the scarcity >
simple regime; new or growing rival uses, with pressing forms of scarcity >
regimes growing more complex; crisis, collapse and degradation due to
heterogeneous over-use > new, typically more integrated, regimes.  Successful
or (more) sustainable cases will typically be forms of ‘integrated water resource
regimes’.
The factor affecting regime shifts in this representation of reality consists
in all three cases of new cognitions regarding the un-sustainability of the actual
resource use. In our theoretical framework on the governance system (chapter
4), we explained that, besides cognitions, the aspects of values and resources
can change. Furthermore, the problem perception might not be the only
‘entrance’ for change agents.  The distribution of governance over scales and
levels, the actors involved and their networks, the strategies and instruments
used, and the responsibilities and resources for implementation can be
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changed by outside factors as well, initiating further changes in other elements
of the regime.
The second place at which regime transformation is dealt with in the research
proposal is the set of partial hypotheses (‘of a temporal nature to be reduced
later’, as it is stated). The first seven are dealing with ‘the emergence and
transformation of institutional resource regimes’. We will analyse them one by
one.
Hypothesis 1 is about the transformation of none to a (very) simple
regime and – in accordance with figure 1 – attributes this transformation to a
degradation of resources commonly perceived or expected by both politicians
and others. The relevance of the hypothesis for this study is limited, since not
many – if any – of these no resource regime starting points are likely to be
found, not only in the cases that will be selected for the analysis of
transformations into more integrated regimes, but also in the twentieth century
country screenings.
Hypothesis 2 is also about the transformation into a simple regime, this
time attributing the transformation to a politically articulated demand for new
public goods or services to be derived from the water resource. The idea behind
this hypothesis might be that the nature of the non private good or service will
provoke a regulative reaction, even if scarcity is not immediately obvious. This
hypothesis is of limited relevance for this study, as well, for reasons similar to
those stated above.
Hypothesis 3 (like all the following ones) is not about the conditions that
provoke regime transformation from one stage to another, but about the nature
and extent of changes. It states that changes in property tittles are often unlikely
and that incremental policy changes, redefining and restricting some use rights,
will dominate the picture. This hypothesis might be regarded as pointing to the
fact that existing property rights form a context for the development of new
water resource governance, restricting its flexibility and forcing a certain degree
of incrementalism. In this respect, it is related to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 states that strong target groups will prevent changes
hurting them. Here too, the basic idea is that the context provided by one of the
elements of the resource regime – not the one that is itself directly affected by
the change agent - will restrict the extent and nature of the regime changes.
Both hypotheses 3 and 4 fit with the general idea that is embedded in   the
governance model, explained in chapter 4. This idea is that elements of the
governance model (and the regime in general, thus including the four elements
of property rights) exert a stabilising influence on each other by processes of
mutual adaptation of values, cognitions and resources.
Hypothesis 5 claims that common property regimes are unlikely to be
established now since present day differentiated post-industrialised societies
tend not to have the type of regional and homogeneous uses that are apt for
these regimes. Therefore, mixed regimes with public interventions are expected
to appear. Although the hypothesis is stated in terms of regime development,
the hypothesis doesn’t really seem to deal with the likelihood of changes, but
more with the aptness of them (the relation between regime change and its
effects on the sustainability of the resource use). We think that the statement as
it is now might hold true in all our cases and even in the twentieth century
country screenings. The question is not so much whether there will be any
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public intervention in an active modern regime, but what the optimal mix
between regulation through property rights and regulation through public
intervention will be. On this subject, the next chapter will elaborate.
Hypothesis 6 seems to be phrased wrongly. When regulative system
refers to property rights and regime is the combination of this and the relevant
policies – like elsewhere in the research proposal – the statement that ‘a weak
policy causes regime changes to influence the regulative system directly’
makes no sense. Its probable meaning is that when the policy is weak, changes
in property rights directly affect the resource use. This seems to be more a
statement about the effects of regime changes than about the likelihood of
them. The next chapter 6 will elaborate on the relationship between property
rights and public intervention in the regime and the influence of this mix on
sustainable use, against the background of some relevant factors. All in all,
hypotheses 5 and 6 will be removed here and re-enter the scene in the form of
a more general concluding hypothesis on the relation between the property
rights – public policy mix and the effect on a more sustainable use. So both are
transferred to the domain of the other main research question.
Hypothesis 7 holds that technological developments that decrease
demand for the resource lower incentives for regime changes. This statement
resembles the famous IPAT formula (Impact = Population x Affluence X
Technology). In our case: Impact on sustainability water resources = Users X
Intensity of uses X Way (‘technology’) of uses. In the research model, most
attention is paid to users and uses. This hypothesis also draws attention to the
technology of use as a factor that provides intervention points for measures
aimed at improving the sustainability of resource use. Here, another relationship
is hypothesised, however, namely that if the objective problem situation
diminishes due to this factor (through problem perception?), the necessity of
regime change will decrease as well. If we regard technological change as a
possible way to combat sustainability problems, this simply states that
successful regimes will tend to be stable. If we regard technological change as
an autonomous force ‘from the outside,’ then technology is only an addition to
possible sources of change, one of the factors that might worsen in many cases
(or improve in other cases) the actual sustainability of water resource use. A
more general formulation would then be that a worsening of the problem by new
users, uses or technologies might provoke new problem awareness resulting in
regime changes, while a softening of the problem by these factors (e.g. less
users, uses, or better technologies) might lead to regime stabilisation. Phrased
in such way, this hypothesis simply points to the feedback from the actual
problem development (as one of the possible change agents) to elements of the
regime, such as the subjective problem perception.
All in all, these seven hypotheses present interesting thoughts, but are not yet
suitable as a framework for explaining regime transformations, especially those
from complex to more integrated regimes. Below, we will try to develop such a
framework in which, by the way, many of the above hypotheses have a natural
place. We also prefer more general hypotheses because they diminish the risk
that the mentioned factors are part of the case setting only in a few cases and
that in many cases the hypotheses simply do not apply.
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5.3 Elaboration of the theoretical framework on regime transformation:
Stability and dynamics
In modern societies, change seems to be overwhelming. Stability might be
regarded as the exception to the rule of change. But it might depend on how we
look. The bottle might be regarded both ‘half full’ and ‘half empty’. The best
predictor for next years’ expenditure of governments still is provided by that of
this year. This holds true even though it are the changes that attract our
attention. Several scholars even point to the relative closedness of systems and
their perseverance in resisting change.
For our purpose, the question whether change or stability is to be
expected most commonly and what the basic assumption underlying our theory
consequently should be, is not very relevant. It is the research interest that
counts here. It is not our purpose to assess the degree of regime change in
general, but to explain it when it occurs. In this case, a different kind of logic
applies.
 When one wants to explain change, it makes sense to work with a
theoretical model that holds stability as its ‘normal status’. Precisely because in
such a model change is not simply accepted as being omnipresent, ‘explained’
on an ad hoc basis by numerous plausible factors (“everything is apt enough to
provoke changes”), a stability model highlights change agents more as
phenomena that deserve a decent explanation. Building on the governance
model of chapter 4, we will elaborate such an explanatory model.
External change agents
Chapter 4 elaborated upon the idea that elements of the governance model
(and the regime in general, so including the four elements of property rights)
exert a stabilising influence on each other by processes of mutual adjustment of
values, cognitions and resources. Changes in the elements of the governance
pattern are then caused by changes in other elements, but ultimately these
changes must have external sources that affect one or more elements.
Likewise, in the relationship between the elements of the governance pattern
and property rights similar processes occur.
In principle, external change agents can enter the scene through all of
the elements (of governance and property rights) discerned in the regime.
There is, however, a difference in terms of the transmissions of pressures for
change among the elements.  Property rights are somewhat more stable and
less oriented towards invoking change than the elements of governance. That
means that though property rights may act as a powerful context for
developments in governance, changing governance patterns is not their
subject. On the other side, many changes in property rights are the effect of
interventions from the governance system (Cf. chapter 3). Changes in property
rights may develop from three sources: (a) changes in the general cultural and
judicial conceptions of property and its meaning in terms of rights, stemming
from general policy institutions and policy processes as a context, (b) specific
and often deliberate influences from the governance pattern on water resource
management adjusting property rights as a means of promoting policy goals,
and (c) economic changes, some with technological developments as drivers,
that create, increase or decrease the value of certain uses and by that of
(aspects of) the resource itself, next to other major societal developments, like
demographic, cultural and spatial.
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Since most influences on regime change (change agents) will start as
influences on one or more of the five elements of governance (cf. research
proposal hypothesis 3) it makes sense to discuss these possible external
factors for each of the five elements. Changes in one element could be followed
by changes in other elements and in property rights, resulting in substantial
regime shifts, as was explained in chapter 4. Mutual adjustment mechanisms,
that without external ‘disturbances’ have a stabilising influence, then become
the mechanisms by which substantial changes in one of the elements lead to
corresponding changes in other elements, resulting in complete regime
changes. 23
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Feedback from the problem situation
In the overview below, some general external sources of change (and general
developments that are influencing the water management field) are mentioned
and linked with the five elements of the governance model (cf. Bressers &
O’Toole, 1995):
(a) Levels and scales of governance
- Rise of the European Union
- Tendency to multi-level governance
                                           
23 Note however that when these other elements (e.g. the constellation of actors involved and
their network relationships) prove to be too hard too tackle also the induced change in for
instance problem perception can be rolled back or isolated in response instead of being
gradually reflected in the rest of the elements. This may be labelled a ‘failed regime change’.
7.
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(b) Actors in the policy network
- Rise of environmental and nature organisations
- Tendency to multi-actor governance: increased number of actors involved in
relevant networks
(c) Problem perception and objectives
- Increase in information on environmental degradation
- Tendency to incorporate multiple perspectives
(d) Strategy and instruments
- Rise of general ideological preferences for indirect and procedural
instrumental strategies
- Tendency to incorporate multiple instruments in the policy mix
(e) Responsibilities and resources for implementation
- Rise of the proportion of (relatively) independent and businesslike
implementation organisations, including privatisation of water management
tasks
- Tendency to rely on more than judicial resources and to clarify
responsibilities
The general hypotheses should, in our opinion, reflect the following sub-
questions of the main research question on regime transformation:
1. Under which circumstances do regime transformations result in more
complex regimes?
2. Under which circumstances do regime transformations result in more
integrated regimes?
3. Which circumstances influence the characteristics of the changes that
occur?
Developing into more complexity
When we speak of complexity, we mean that regimes can be characterised by a
multi-variate format in most of their elements (see the examples above). A
regime becomes more complex when more layers and scales are involved,
more actors are involved, more perceptions of the problem and accompanying
goals are involved, more instruments are part of the policy mix and more
organisations share responsibilities for implementation. Complexity as such is
not wrong. Most of the time, growth in complexity is an answer to real needs
and developments. As a matter of fact, societies generally grew into more
complexity generally during most of the modern times. This sector is no
exception to that general course of development. A growth in complexity of its
governance can be viewed as a logical adjustment to such developments and
pressures.  Thus, many change agents, like technological developments, add
new scales, new actors, new problem perceptions, new instruments and new
responsibilities to the existing ones. For example: different levels of government
can define different specific regimes or elements of the general regime. So in
that case, the regime gets not only differentiated due to the various possible
specific uses, but also due to the multi-level character of regimes.
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The above leads to hypothesis 1 that is specified at the end of the
section.
Developing into more integration
While the growth in complexity in water management regimes seems a fairly
straightforward part of a more general development in society, integration as a
development is not. In the research proposal, the central assumption is that
integration will occur when the relevant actors acknowledge that integration is
necessary to prevent further deterioration of the resource. That means that
integration is not a spontaneous development, but has a deliberate character.
By (full) integration we mean:
(a) Internal integration within the elements of public governance
- that levels are interacting more closely and are aware of their mutual
dependencies,
- that actors belong to ‘policy communities’ rather than ‘issue networks’,
implying more interaction and consensus orientation,
- that interrelatedness of different aspects of the problem and their
dependencies are recognised and intensely debated, and that goals are set
accordingly,
- that the policy mix contains instruments that are mutually reinforcing each
others' incentives,
- that the implementing organisations share their resources (e.g. information,
manpower) and co-operate intensively to complement each other.
(b) External integration between the governance pattern and property rights
regarding water resource management and other relevant sectors.
Chapter 4 deals with relationships between the elements of governance and
chapter 6 with the relationship between governance and property rights. These
relationships, however, are not regarded as forms of integration in the
conceptualisation of this study.
Obviously, much integration will be of a partial kind. In principle, a lot of
combinations could be imagined. For the purpose of analysing the development
and effect of regime changes, such a differentiated view, however, is not easily
usable as a single integration-‘variable’.
The governance concept that was described in chapter 4 contains the
assumption that the various elements of governance will tend to adjust to each
other. Thus, although empirically many intermediate forms can exist, we
assume for now that the five elements will form cohesive patterns that differ
more or less clearly in terms of complexity and integration.
When conceived of as dichotomies, the two variables of complexity and
integration would form a four cell matrix. We do not choose such a
representation, however, and we do not stick to the representation of integrated
regimes as a logical next step following the development of more complex
regimes either. More singular (or simple) regimes (one level, one governing
actor, one problem aspect – e.g. a certain use – one instrument, one
implementer) will not be in need of integration. Only after some growth into
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complexity, integration becomes a relevant concept. But then, it is by no means
a logical follow up.  Complex but fragmented regimes are empirically quite
common as well. In fact, while integration has clear theoretical advantages - as
we will show in chapter 7 - it also comes at a price. Every form of integration
creates the need for additional interaction and increases, at least initially,
transaction costs. While more complexity is part of a stream of societal
development, both integration and differentiation (or: fragmentation) seem to
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Figure 2: Regime Developments
This means that integration typically stems from discernible change agents that
demand some form of integration (see examples a, b, c, d and e above). An
‘integration’-agent can, for instance, consist of the recognition of the interaction
of multiple water uses or of a European Union directive that demands multilevel
co-operation in water resource management planning. Also international and
inter-local learning is a possible change agent. Unlike an increase in
complexity, thus, developments in the direction of more integration need some
sort of deliberate attempt by motivated actors.
The above leads to hypothesis 2 that is specified at the end of the
section.
Conditions for integration
Until now, we stated that regime changes in the direction of more integration
are not spontaneous and will not only require external change agents (like all
other regime changes), but typically will require a deliberate attempt to push for
integration by motivated actors to occur. That leaves the question open,
however, when such attempts are likely to be successful. Knoepfel (1995: 202-
203), for instance, assumes that integration and co-operation between two or
more agencies will go better when these agencies each have less separate
tasks and goals and the agencies are matrix organisations.
We express here the following expectations. Attempts to change regimes into a
more integrated status will have relatively more success when:
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a) There is already a longer tradition of integration in the water management
sector (see the specification of integration at the beginning of this
subsection).
b) There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of
non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).
c) There is a notion of possible joint gains from integration, so-called ‘win-win-
situations’ (joint chances).
d) There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and
altering the governance pattern in his own way if no solution is reached
(credible alternative threat).
e) There are well functioning institutions that provide a fertile ground for
integration attempts (institutional interfaces)
The last stimulating condition, in particular, needs some further specification.
These institutional interfaces (as opposed to institutional barriers), we mean, for
instance, well functioning free mass media as a pre-requisite for a more
integrated public debate on the various aspects and perceptions of the problem,
strong representative organisations that make is possible for large groups to
become an effective actor in the policy network, or water laws or environmental
laws that enable attempts to increase integration in water resource
management strategies.
The above leads to hypothesis 3 that is specified at the end of the
section.
The devil is in the details
Naturally the dimensions of simplicity vs. complexity and integration vs.
fragmentation are characteristics of the regime that are of a rather general
nature. Often ‘the devil is in the details’. When some actors find the network
closed for them, it is important to learn who they are. And when new aspects of
the problem gain recognition, it matters whether these are related to
sustainability or not. Etceteras. Though at a general level no precise prediction
can be given for these contents matters, the general proposition of mutual
adjustment of elements of governance leads to the expectation that the
balances in the initially unaffected elements of governance are reflected in the
way in which the bigger or lesser ‘seismic shocks’ caused by change agents are
absorbed in other elements. This idea provides an umbrella for the hypotheses
3 and 4 of the research proposal, among others. It stipulates that not only the
degree of regime transformation, but also aspects like the distribution of costs
and benefits might be important to explain. For the impact of the regime on a
more sustainable use these kinds of characteristics may be important too.
The above leads to hypothesis 4, that is specified below.
Drivers of regime change (‘external change agents’) intervene in one or more
elements of the governance pattern directly and cause adjustments by other
elements of the governance pattern and possibly also property rights through
that element. Against this background (cf. chapter 4), this chapter leads, all in
all, to the following general hypotheses:
1. Most change agents will lead to more differentiation in the regime (resulting
in more complex regimes).
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2. Other external change agents of a specific nature (see above) can also lead
to integration in one or some elements of the regime, but only in
combination with deliberate attempts of motivated actors (ultimately resulting
in integrated regimes or in ‘failed’ regime shifts with encapsulated initial
changes).
3. Integration attempts will be more successful when:
a) There already is a longer tradition of integration in the water management
sector (see the specification of integration at the beginning of this
subsection).
b) There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of
non integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).
c) There is a notion of possible joint gains from integration, so-called ‘win-win-
situations’ (joint chances).
d) There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and
altering the governance pattern in his own way if no solution is reached
(credible alternative threat).
e) There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile a ground for
integration attempts (institutional interfaces)
4. The more detailed characteristics of regime changes reflect to a large
extent, the balances in other elements of the regime that were not directly
influenced by the change agent(s) initially (including property rights).
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6 The co-efficacy of property rights and government
intervention
This chapter focuses on the question of how policy decisions and property
arrangements come together to determine the sustainability of environmental
management.  The chapter lays out an argument that almost every policy
decision can be interpreted as a change in property rights, or, in fact,
government intervention in property rights.  On the basis of this argument, the
chapter then discusses to which extent government intervention in private
property rights is environmentally desirable.  Government intervention here
refers to the government aspect of governance, the complete model of which
was laid out in chapter 4.
As the project proposal emphasized, there is a need for analysing the
combination of resource specific property arrangements and governance
(policy) strategies existing with respect to natural resources, which the project
calls institutional resource regimes.  Thereby, the project aims to concentrate
on the possibilities for public intervention in property rights, which adds the
political steering dimension to the property rights approach.  An institutional
resource regime, thus, provides the institutional framework for the political
steering and managing of the demands of heterogeneous user groups.  A
strength of this perspective is that institutions, specifically property
arrangements, are not just treated as frameworks within which actions are
carried out, but also identified as the result and integral part of the political
process.
As the proposal points out, this perspective on institutions as both the result and
an important element of the process allows the project to avoid a fundamental
weakness of many studies of resource regimes.  The latter tend to focus on the
analysis of the regulative systems as they exist at one point in time.  Lesser
emphasis is generally placed on an analysis of processes of change.  For the
highest degree of policy relevance, however, i.e. to be able to avoid further
degradation of resources, it is important to know when and under what
conditions in the political process regimes can be changed and how this change
can be accomplished and managed.  The study of institutional resource
regimes combining property rights arrangements with policy intervention allows
us to obtain such insights.
The focus on the interaction of policy with property rights is important, because
in "highly developed societies characterized by increasingly heterogeneous
demands and an expanding scope of effects - factors which dictate against a
local and regional solution like the common property [arrangements]," guidance
of heterogeneous, growing and increasingly rival use demands is required.24  In
the case of homogenous demands for resource benefits discussed in much of
the literature, scholars often found that is was possible to prevent the
degradation of resources on the basis of voluntary cooperation, i.e. without
                                           
24 See the project proposal.
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state intervention.25  From a liberal perspective, this can be viewed as a very
efficient strategy, of course.  In the context of complex resource regimes,
however, this solution is less likely to be feasible or effective.  Here, the task of
government intervention becomes to develop an integrated governance regime
to avoid conflicts in property rights.26  In fact, government intervention is likely to
be an important although not necessary determinant of change from complex to
integrated regimes, either on its own initiative or because of a demand for such
change voiced by one of the other actors involved in the regime (for a detailed
discussion of institutional resource regime change see chapter 7).
6.1 Policy as a Change in Property Rights
Almost every policy can be interpreted as a change in property rights.  An
institutional resource regime, thus, is determined at any point in time by how
policies structure, i.e. create and influence, property arrangements.  Policies
shape property rights by intervening in specific parts of the bundle of rights held
by the property owner.  A per litre water charge imposed on withdrawal of water
from the river by owners of real estate on the river banks, for instance,
establishes a new property situation.  If the real estate owners were not
charged for the water before, they either "owned the right to free water
withdrawal" or rights to the water were not defined.  In the latter case, the water
resource was an open-access resources of which the appropriators took
advantage.  After the policy change, the definition of property rights is clear.
The real estate owners now own the right to obtain a given quantity of water for
a given price.  In fact, they can go to court and claim that right, if they are being
charged more.  Alternatively, the government can take them to court, if they
refuse to pay the charge.  For purposes of environmental management, the
interpretation of the situation before the policy change does not matter.  Real
estate owners had free access to the water, and therefore no incentives to save
water.  For legal purposes, different interpretations of the situation before the
policy change might matter, to the extent that the difference influences the
possibilities of government to change the rights.  After all, creating property
rights in a previous open-access situation is less interventionist from a legal and
political perspective than the appropriation of property rights previously held by
private owners.27
Different degrees of policy intervention in private property rights, thus, may
require different actions by government, and therefore different levels of political
                                           
25 It is possible to distinguish between rules concerning property ownership made by
government and rules made by the collective.  Both, however, are forms of governance. Ostrom
and her colleagues clearly do deal with questions of governance in their studies.  However, in
the settings they choose to study, government intervention is often not necessary (and
sometimes not possible).  The heterogeneous use cases in highly developed societies with
relatively strong states studied in this project, in contrast, can focus on questions of governance
with government.
26 Given the distinction between de facto and de jure property rights discussed in chapter 3, the
task of government may well be to avoid conflicts between de facto property rights rather than
de jure property rights, at least in the short term.
27 The counter argument is, however, that customary rights often can also be claimed in a court
suit.
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will and capacity depending on the constitutional framework.  Sometimes
governments can simply change specific property rights through simple policies,
such as with respect to water charges, for instance.  In other cases,
government might have to first pursue a constitutional change in the constitution
to be allowed a certain intervention in private property, or have to compensate
the property owners.  The extreme cases of government intervention in private
property are, of course, expropriation and nationalization of private property.
Because of their extreme nature and conflict with the constitutions of most
democracies, these strategies are rarely chosen.  For most environmental
purposes, however, they are also not necessary, as governments can achieve
substantial change in environmental management through simple policy
modifications of property rights.  As this theoretical framework focuses on
environmental management rather than legal questions, we will not pursue the
legal perspective of government intervention in property rights here.  Rather,
interpreting policy changes as changes in specific property rights, we will
explore the environmentally desirable extent of government intervention in
private property rights.
6.2 The Environmental Desirability of Intervention in Property Rights
The following discussion will show that the environmental desirability of
government intervention in property rights depends on the specific resource in
question and the socio-economic context of its management.  This socio-
economic context is a function of the number of appropriators from the resource
and the extent of collective action problems among them, the relationship
between the economic and environmental values of the resource, and the level
of government capacity and commitment to environmental objectives.  The role
of the relationship between economic and environmental values of the
resource, the e-e gap, has already been discussed in chapter 3 and will be
recapitulated only briefly in the following discussion.  The other factors,
however, will be laid out in some detail, before the analysis draws the different
factors together to provide a comprehensive image of the environmental
desirability of government intervention in property rights and its determinants.
6.2.1 From Property Regimes to the "Size of CAP"
As a first step toward an analysis of the environmental desirability of
government intervention in private property arrangements, we suggest to
abandon the traditional categorization of property regimes as private property,
common property, and open-access (Feeny, Berkes, McKay, and Acheson
1992).  Rather than thinking of these property arrangements as categorically
different, this analysis perceives them as stages on a continuum.  After all, both
private and common property regimes are essentially special cases of private
property arrangements, with the difference that in the latter case the number of
appropriators is greater than one.  Furthermore, the reasons for resource
degradation for private property, i.e. "lack of incentives to fight against negative
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externalities28" can also be applied to common property.  It is, after all, this lack
of incentives to fight against negative externalities which drives non-compliance
with group rules by members of the group.
The differences between private and common property regimes on the one side
and open-access on the other are bigger.  In the legal sense, open-access
means that no property rights have been defined and that therefore nobody
holds the rights to the given resource.  Environmentally, however, the expected
consequences of an open-access situation are similar to a common property
regime that has failed to achieve a sustainable cooperative solution.
Alternatively, even without the definition of legal rights in the Western sense or
even tenure in a more traditional sense, appropriators from an open-access
resource might achieve sustainable management of a resource similar to a
successful common property regime.
Environmentally, then, the difference between a common property regime and
an open-access situation is that the former is more likely to succeed in the
sustainable management of a resource, while the latter is more likely to result in
its overexploitation.  This dynamic can be expected because in common
property regimes the group of appropriators would tend to be better defined,
and therefore communication and cooperation are more easily established.  In
other words, common property regimes generally have less collective action
problems, due, for instance, to lower transaction costs.  Fundamentally,
however, common property regimes can be perceived as cases in which
appropriators have developed successful institutions of governance, while in
open-access situations these institutions have broken down or have never been
created.  In terms of a continuum, the transition from common property regimes
to open-access corresponds to an increasing breakdown of institutions of
governance among appropriators from resources.
The potential sustainability of environmental management in private property
situations, again ranging from individual ownership to open-access situations,
is, thus, a function of the collective action problems among the appropriators, in
shorthand the size of CAP.  Governance breaks down and common property
turns into open-access when these collective action problems become too big
to be solved.  As Ostrom and others have shown, the size of CAP is determined
by the characteristics of the appropriators from the resource, such as the
number of decision makers, the heterogeneity of the group in terms of
capabilities, preferences, information, beliefs, effective leadership, and the
internal structure of the actors (Keohane and Ostrom 1995).  Furthermore
characteristics of the resource and socio-economic context, such as
rivalry/subtractibility of the benefits from the resource, underlying geophysical
structures, existing institutional arrangements, and exogenous determinants
such as technology of extraction matter.  The size of CAP thus needs to be
viewed as an index summarizing these variables.  We adopt this construct in
the interest of simplification and illustration of our argument.  Based on the size
of CAP, we can align the three "property regimes" along a continuum from small
collective action problems with high probabilities of successful cooperation to
large collective action problems with low probabilities of successful cooperation.
                                           
28 See project proposal.
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The smaller the size of CAP, the more economically efficient the property
arrangement.
6.2.2 From State Ownership to Government Intervention
As a second step in the development of our argument, we suggest abandoning
the traditional fourth category of property regimes, state ownership, as well.
"State ownership" insinuates that an entire resource is owned by the state in
contrast to resources held under private property or common property regimes
in which the state is not present at all.  Neither case is common in real life.  If
we return to our conception of property rights as bundles of rights defined with
respect to different attributes of a resource, we see that individuals rarely own
rights to all attributes of a resource.  This is partly the case because defining
and enforcing property rights to all attributes would be prohibitively costly, partly
because governments are unwilling to relinquish rights to certain attributes.  For
example, governments generally hold the rights to the airspace above "private"
land, or do not give citizens the right to use their "private" ponds to drown
people.  In almost all cases of private property ownership, the government
retains some rights, precluding the owners of the remaining rights from a certain
action or forcing them to execute another.
In common usage, government rights are often referred to as policies or
regulations, but from an economic/environmental perspective, they are, in fact,
property rights to attributes of goods held by government.  In the case of what
traditionally is identified as state ownership of natural resources, the
government just holds more rights and, most importantly, rights to more visible
attributes of the resource.  In consequence, we suggest transforming the
category of state ownership to a continuum of government intervention, where a
higher level of government intervention means that the government holds rights
to more attributes of a resource.  A low degree of government intervention, in
contrast, refers to what traditionally is called private property, common property,
or open-access regimes.
The degree of government intervention, then, forms a second continuum.  It is
fundamentally different from the size of CAP, since it captures the extent to
which attributes are held by a formal authority.  Any property arrangement with
respect to a given natural resource is defined by the level of collective action
problems among the appropriators and the degree of government intervention
in the rights of these appropriators.  Indeed, governments intervene to a similar
degree at any size of CAP, or - if described in the traditional categories - in
"private property," "common property," or "open-access."
6.2.3 State Capacity and Commitment to Sustainability: the C-C Level
The third step in the development of our argument introduces government
capacity and commitment to sustainability (in other words, government's will
and skill) as an additional determinant of the environmental implications of
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property arrangements, represented by the c-c level.  The c-c level of a
government determines the environmental implications of government
intervention.  Government intervention is often considered as an alternative to
private ownership, in cases in which the maximization of private economic gain
leads to the undersupply of an environmental good or the oversupply of an
environmental bad.  The capacity and commitment of governments to protect
their own property rights and to use environmental resources in a sustainable
manner determine the chances that government intervention does indeed lead
to an environmentally superior outcome in such a situation.  Government
intervention has a high potential for environmental stewardship only if the
respective government has high levels of capacity and commitment.  The lower
the c-c level of the state, ceteris paribus, the fewer resources should be subject
to government intervention and the more should be held in private property
arrangements.29
A high level of capacity, i.e. skill, captures the ability of government to achieve
its desired policy outcomes.  A high level of commitment, i.e. will, refers to the
mission of the government in terms of maximizing public environmental welfare
rather than private gain.  In the context of this development of our argument,
states with high c-c levels are those which have both the capacity and the
commitment to protect their property rights to attributes of natural resources and
to use these resources in an environmentally sustainable manner.  States with
low c-c levels, in contrast, are those where the government either lacks the
capacity to protect government rights to natural resources, or pursues the
maximization of private economic gain rather than public environmental welfare
or both.  Thus, commitment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an
environmentally desirable impact of government intervention.  The same
applies to capacity, with the caveat that capacity without commitment is likely to
have worse environmental impacts than commitment without capacity, as
discussed below.  The relationship between high and low c-c levels is, of
course, not a dichotomous one, but continuous.  Most governments in the world
do not fall on either end of the spectrum but somewhere in-between.
Government capacity is a necessary condition for a high potential of
government intervention for environmental stewardship because only a capable
government will be able to enforce rights and regulations and be able to protect
or provide an environmental good, which is threatened by private interests.
General government capacity is a function of the availability of resources to
government, such as material and human resources, and the efficiency of their
utilization (Organski and Kugler 1980, Arbetman and Kugler 1997).
Government capacity is, to a large extent, determined by its perceived
legitimacy and authority and its corresponding support in the population and
among powerful (military or economic) elites.  If a government lacks support
within the country, its activities become costly and, ultimately, weaker.  Specific
government capacity, i.e. government skill with respect to its involvement in a
particular issue or issue area is a function of the validity of the policy strategy
chosen, its implementation, and its integration with related policies.  Since these
three factors will be taken up in detail in chapter 7, they will not be discussed
                                           
29 Please note that the effects of capacity and commitment are combined in the c-c level purely
for illustrative purposes, as these variables do not necessarily move together.
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further at this point.  Suffice it to say, that a weak performance by government
with respect to these aspects has a direct negative impact on sustainable use.
Therefore, such a weakness implies that the mix between private property
rights and government intervention should be different.
Government commitment, in the context of this paper, identifies whether the
government is likely to maximize public environmental welfare or private
economic benefit.  If a government is interested in deriving the maximum
“private” economic benefits from environmental resources under its control
rather than protecting the public good of environmental quality, government
intervention is similar in its environmental implications to unregulated private
property arrangements.  For a government that is weak in terms of commitment
to sustainability, government intervention will be less environmentally desirable
than for a government that is strong in this respect.
Different degrees and causes of weakness of governments in terms of
commitment can be imagined.  On the one side, governments might give in to
pressure from special interests and therefore might not be sensitive to
questions of environmental sustainability.  On the other side, governments
might pursue their own financial gain through the unsustainable exploitation of
“state-owned” natural resources.  From those governments, it is sometimes not
a big step to governments appropriating previously private property for their
own gain.30
Given the constraints capacity and commitment impose on the potential of
government intervention for environmental stewardship, it becomes obvious
that a high degree of government intervention in private property arrangements
is not necessarily environmentally superior to a low degree of government
intervention.  Indeed, only in situations in which a capable government pursues
the public good of environmental quality has government intervention the
potential to improve on environmental outcomes from private ownership.
Ceteris paribus, a high c-c level of the government increases the environmental
desirability of government intervention in private property arrangements.
                                           
30 In some developing countries, a lack of government commitment has been reflected in an
intentional failure of governments to recognize traditional (tribal or communal) rights of
ownership to natural resources.  Governments have frequently appropriated such resources, in
order to increase governmental or personal revenues or to sustain political support by giving
these resources to political and economic allies.  A lack of commitment based on such a
preference structure of the governing elites will likely carry the worst consequences for
environmental stewardship as it does not only affect the environmental fate of “state-owned”
resources but of all resources.  Predatory behavior by government has two consequences.
Since the new “owners” of the resource are generally aware of the illegitimacy of their rights and
the lack of accountability of the government, they have an incentive to deplete the resource as
fast as possible. After all, they know that they might fall out of favor with the government
themselves, or fear the overthrow of the government by a disenchanted public.  Likewise, the
traditional owners of resources have similar incentives to deplete them as fast as possible, if
they witness such predatory behavior by government, since they have to fear that they will be
the next ones to lose their rights.  The higher the chances for resources to be appropriated by
governments, the higher the discount rate owners will apply to future revenues from resources
(Deacon 1994).
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6.2.4 Recapitulation: The e-e Gap
The fourth variable influencing the environmental implications of property
arrangements and therefore the environmental desirability of government
intervention is the e-e gap, which we introduced in chapter 3.  Recall that the e-
e gap is the difference between the "economic value" of a resource and its
"environmental value,"  with "economic value" referring to the maximum long-
term economic value to be obtained from any use of the resource, while
"environmental value" refers to the economic value that can be obtained from
the environmentally most desirable use of the resource.
The e-e gap determines if the economically most efficient property arrangement
is the environmentally most desirable one.  In chapter 3, we saw that this the
case if the e-e gap is small (the fishing pond in Norway), but not if it is large (the
fishing pond in Paris).  If the e-e gap is small, i.e. the economic and
environmental values of a resource are close, the decision-maker's
maximization of expected (economic) utility implies a maximization of
environmental stewardship.  If, however, the e-e gap is large, i.e. the difference
between the two values is substantial, the maximization of expected (economic)
utility is likely to result in the maximization of environmental degradation.  This
insight was important with respect to the implications of private property rights
for environmental stewardship.  With the aid of the e-e gap, we showed that a
small size of CAP only implies a greater potential for environmental stewardship
in certain cases, specifically in cases in which the e-e gap is small.  In cases, in
which the e-e gap is large, a small size of CAP implies a greater potential for an
economically efficient environmental degradation of the resource.  Here,
government intervention on behalf of sustainability would be desirable.

6.2.5 Pulling It All Together
These four variables, the level of collective action problems among
appropriators, the degree of government intervention, the capacity and
commitment to sustainability of the respective government, and the relationship
between the environmental and economic values of a given resource determine
the environmental implications of any property arrangement.  Since our interest
is primarily in potential policy implications of this analysis, the degree of
government intervention will be treated as the dependent variable in the
following discussion.  Based on the above analysis, the environmentally
desirable degree of government intervention is a function of the size of CAP,
the c-c level of the government, and the e-e gap, in the context of a given
resource.  Figure 3 combines these factors, depicting the interaction between
the c-c level of the state, the size of CAP, and the e-e gap and their implications
for the environmentally desirable level of government intervention.  This figure
illustrates under which conditions a larger share of the attributes of a given
resource needs to be protected by government intervention for sustainability.
Figure 3 demonstrates that for a large e-e gap, the highest degree of
environmental desirability of government intervention applies to cases in which
a high c-c level is combined with a small size of CAP.  The lowest degree of
environmental desirability of government intervention applies to the opposite
case.  If a low c-c level is combined with a large size of CAP, government
intervention will not be able to significantly increase the potential for
environmental stewardship, and indeed might lower it.  Cases for which a low c-
c level is associated with a small size of CAP, or in which a high c-c level is
associated with large size of CAP fall somewhere in the middle between the two
extremes above.  The reasons for this ranking in the environmental desirability
of government intervention is that given a large e-e gap a small size of CAP is
likely to lead to the most efficient environmental degradation.  In contrast, a
large size of CAP has the potential to inhibit the most efficient exploitation of
this resource, thus, requiring less government intervention to protect the
resource.  Furthermore, a state with a high c-c level is more likely to pursue and
achieve environmentally desirable outcomes than a state with a low one.
The presence of a small e-e gap changes the situation dramatically.  Here, the
highest degree of environmentally desirable government intervention results
from the presence of a high c-c level and a large size of CAP, because the
latter leads in this case to the greatest waste of natural resources.  Since a
small e-e gap means that the economic efficiency resulting from a small size of
CAP translates into environmental "efficiency," the environmentally desirable
level of government intervention in the case of a small size of CAP is lower.
Since for any size of CAP a higher c-c level translates into a higher degree of
environmentally desirable government intervention, the lowest degree of
environmental desirability of government intervention applies in cases in which
a small size of CAP is matched with a low c-c level.  Again, the relationship
between the presence of a high c-c level and small size of CAP on the one side,
and a low c-c level and a large size of CAP on the other cannot be determined
easily.
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As expressed by Figure 3, higher c-c levels are, ceteris paribus, associated with
higher degrees of environmental benefits of government intervention.  Putting it
more controversially, Figure 3 highlights the limits of the environmental
desirability of government intervention if a government is weak in terms of
capacity or commitment.  Looking at government capacity and practices in
countries around the globe, these conditions would apply to a large share of
global resources.
At the same time, the support for the claim that a large e-e gap, ceteris paribus,
is associated with a higher level of desirability of government intervention
should become clear.  Thus, the e-e gap highlights the limitations of private
property rights as a means to raise the potential for environmental stewardship,
just as the c-c level identifies the limitations of government intervention.
In addition, Figure 3 illustrates that the degree of environmental desirability of
government intervention is larger for a small size of CAP if the e-e gap is small,
but may be smaller for a large size of CAP if the e-e gap is large.  This finding is
in stark contrast to the agreement in the literature that open-access resources
generally fare the worst.  This discussion suggests that this is not necessarily
the case.  A small number of appropriators from a resource can be associated
with worse degradation if the increase in efficiency in the maximization of the
economic value of the resource is associated with an increase in the efficiency
of environmental degradation.  The neglect of this dynamic in the literature
results from the fact that most of the resources that are usually considered are
resources under some form of environmental use, where the difference is in
degree of sustainability of that use (such as land used for agriculture, or forests
used for timber extraction).  Again, the analysis highlights that a small number
of appropriators from a resource will only necessarily be associated with higher
environmental benefits, if the environmental costs and benefits of actions are
fully internalised, which would render the e-e gap small.
The above arguments can be summarized in the following hypotheses:
1. The higher the c-c level the state, ceteris paribus, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of government intervention.31
2. The larger the e-e gap, ceteris paribus, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of government intervention.
3. Given a small e-e gap, the larger the size of CAP, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of government intervention.
                                           
31 Future research needs to look at the relationship between c-c levels and environmental state
intervention to determine if strategic behavior on the part of potential environmental “villains”
exists.  Strategic polluters, for instance, could anticipate a response by a state with high c-c
levels and therefore reduce their environmentally polluting activities.  In other words, while the
environmental desirability of government intervention in theory is higher the higher the c-c level,
in practice high c-c levels might be associated with lower levels of actual intervention.  This
would suggest a non-linear relationship.
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4. Given a large e-e gap, the smaller the size of CAP, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of government intervention.
6.2.6 Implications
The implications of this analysis are very informative with respect to the
property rights debate.  They show how the various arguments and evidence
from previous research can be integrated into one cohesive picture.  Thus, the
analysis supports findings in the resource economics literature that show that
there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical reason for believing that one
property regime is generally environmentally superior to another.  As Devlin and
Grafton (1998) state there is no "best" regime from an environmental
perspective.
Furthermore, by abandoning the traditional categorization of property regimes
and replacing it with two continuous variables, the size of CAP, and the degree
of government intervention, the analysis can focus on key determinants of the
environmental implications of different property arrangements: the c-c level, and
the e-e gap.  In addition, the argument illustrates the dynamic nature of the
environmental implications of property arrangements, allowing scholars to
capture changes in these implications as a function of changes in specific
underlying conditions over time.  Thus, the project allows us to take a step in
the desired direction as identified by Schlager and Ostrom (1992):
Instead of blind faith in private ownership, common-property
institutions, or government intervention, scholars need a better
understanding of: (1) the conditions that enhance or detract from the
emergence of more efficient property-rights regimes related to
diverse resources, (2) the stability or instability of these systems
when challenged by various types of exogenous or endogenous
changes, and (3) the costs of enforcing regulations that are not
agreed upon by those involved (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, p. 260).
The argument also makes explicit the potential and limitations of various
property rights based strategies for improving environmental stewardship.  First,
the analysis highlights that for government intervention to be environmentally
desirable, governments have to be both committed to environmental goals and
capable of effectively pursuing their policy objectives.  The analysis, therefore,
shows that critics of government intervention are correct in highlighting its
limitations, and there is ample evidence on the nationalization and subsequent
degradation of environmental resources, especially in developing countries, to
support their argument.  Recognizing the impact of capacity and commitment in
determining the potential and limitations of state intervention highlights the
importance of further research on the determinants of these two variables.
At the same time, the analysis underlines that these conclusions cannot easily
be generalized across cases or countries and that government intervention can
indeed be environmentally desirable.  If governments are both capable and
committed, government intervention can prevent or at least reduce
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environmental damage by unregulated private ownership.  Importantly, one
finds the closest match for such conditions especially in those countries where
the costs of government intervention and the benefits of private ownership are
proclaimed most loudly: the industrialized countries, especially the US.  Here
the critics of private property rights are correct when arguing that government
intervention can increase the public good of environmental welfare.
Secondly, the analysis highlights the potential and limitations of privatisation
and improvements in the security of property rights for environmental
stewardship.  In other words, our argument illustrates under which
circumstances an increase in individual control over natural resources, as
advocated by proponents of privatisation and secure property rights is
environmentally desirable.  If the e-e gap is small, the advocates of private
property rights are correct, and therefore one will find examples cited in support
of their arguments to be characterized by the respective conditions: small e-e
gaps (and/or low c-c levels).  As the analysis has shown, a small number of
appropriators from a resource is unequivocally preferable in the case of a small
e-e gap.  Given a significant divergence between economic and environmental
values of a resource, however, the number of appropriators from the resource
has ambiguous implications for environmental stewardship.  In the latter case,
governments would probably fare better in setting up institutional support for
governance problems (which can draw on the capacity of the community if the
central government is lacking capacity) than in "privatising" the resource.
Alternatively, for governments with sufficient capacity and commitment,
privatisation could be accompanied by the retaining of specific rights by the
state, i.e. government intervention ensuring sustainable resource use.
Even more, our analysis suggests that rather than viewing a resource as being
managed under one particular property regime, we need to differentiate
between the different attributes of the resource and identify the environmentally
desirable owner or owners for those.  Thus, some parts of the bundle of rights
associated with a resource might be held by the state, others by a group of
owners, and others again by individual owners.  Who should own a specific
right or bundle of rights needs to be decided on the basis of the factors
identified in this discussion; the c-c level, e-e gap, and size of CAP.
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7 Regime effects on sustainable water use
Having discussed what factors influence the optimal property rights – public
governance mix in water resource regimes in the previous chapter, we now
explore the relationship between this mix and the resulting more or less
sustainable resource use. First, the four hypotheses from the research proposal
on this relationship will be discussed briefly. Then, an elaborated theoretical
model will be presented.
The first of the four hypotheses in the research proposal on regime effects
states a sort of base-line assumption. Uncontrolled but wanted resources are
endangered. In our case studies, this kind of situations can actually occur, but
only for specific uses that are still in the status of no regime (while for other
uses the regime may already be much further developed.
The second and third hypotheses are elaborated in this chapter and are
basically kept.
The fourth hypothesis points to the problem situation and the perception
of it (temporary vs. chronic, local vs. global) as an interaction variable modifying
the relationship between regime elements and the behaviour of users. Since
(almost) no further theoretical elaboration is presented in the proposal and the
hypothesis can only be tested by multiple case comparisons, the relevance of
the hypothesis depends especially on the case selection. Possibly intervening
case characteristics should be consciously kept constant or deliberately used to
differentiate the cases. We already decided on the approximate scale of the
cases and our suggestion is that we should concentrate on more chronic
threats to sustainability, peak incidents, or cases where a technological solution
to the scarcity problem is already in sight.
The general principle that guides us in the relationship between this mix and the
resulting more or less sustainable resource use is that the incentives for the
development of water resource management and use that are provided by the
whole of the regime (property rights plus public governance) will contribute to a
more sustainable water resource in as far the following conditions are met:
(1) The completeness and validity of the ‘policy theory’ that is explicitly or
implicitly the foundation of the elements of the regime and the incentives it is
expected to provide, need to be sufficient.
(2) The degree and quality of the implementation of the incentives should be
sufficient.
(3) The degree of coherence and integration in the regime and its
implementation should be sufficient.
Validity. The optimal mix between the policy and property rights aspects of the
regime mix could be regarded as an aspect of the validity of the policy theory
(‘policy design’). The analysis that is developed in chapter 6 provides a tool to
assess the extent to which there is a need for government intervention (possibly
by actors other than government as well, but, in any case, as a form of public
governance, outside intervention, in addition to the self governing capacity that
is provided by the property rights pattern). Chapter 6 analyses in how far there
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is a task for policy. But, of course, that policy will only improve the sustainability
of water resource use when it really fills the gaps that the initial property rights
pattern leaves.
So, the concept of ‘policy theory’ (Hoogerwerf, 1990) encompasses more
than just the completeness of the policy design regarding the various aspects of
the problem, e.g. the uses and users of the water resource. The concept of
‘policy theory’ builds on the idea that policy can be regarded as an attempt to
attain certain goals with certain means in a certain time perspective. Even if the
policy is actually very heterogeneous and is also to be viewed as the temporary
or intermediate result of an ongoing struggle between various interests and their
representatives,  its nature by which it deviates from all kinds of other ‘products’
of society is that it is about influencing developments. As a consequence, it
builds, explicitly or implicitly, on sets of assumptions regarding the causal
relationships between variables in the targeted policy field, relationships
between ‘chosen and newly induced causes’ and ‘desired effects’ (sometimes
called final relationships) and relationships between general values and more
specific standards and objectives. These assumptions can be more or less valid
from the perspective of a certain policy objective. In our case (EUWARENESS),
this is the perspective of sustainable use (cf. chapter 2).
The aspects of the policy sector that the policy theory should reckon with
include not only the causes, features, and effects of the physical water resource
use, but also the pattern of property rights that is connected to these uses. To
design a policy that improves the use from a sustainability perspective the
policy has to reckon with what is already there as ‘self-governing’ capacity and
what is lacking.
An important aspect is the instrumental validity of the policy: ‘are the
chosen strategies and instruments in principle, when implemented correctly,
capable of causing the desired results?’ Hoogerwerf (1990) provides a
methodology to reconstruct the policy theory.
Implementation. The sets of incentives that are provided by the regime
(including both property rights and governance) are in many cases not self
executing. In order to be realised in practice, many need interaction processes
in which they are applied (cf. second sentence of hypothesis 2 on regime
effects in the proposal). Often these processes deal with the individualisation of
general rules and subsidy or charge schemes or the enforcement of restrictions
in resource use that are mandated by such rules or alternatively by the
decisions of owners. When part of the foreseen incentives are not implemented
or implemented incorrectly (meaning that the form in which implementation
takes place decreases the incentive effect) even in principle complete and valid
elements of the regime will prove to be insufficient to counteract unsustainable
practices in resource use.
For the analysis of both aspects (probability of application and degree of
correct application) the ‘policy instrumentation theory’ (e.g. Bressers and Klok
1988, Klok 1991, Bressers and Ringeling 1995, Bressers, Klok and O’Toole,
2000) contains modules, that can be used as a methodology. On the
assumption that implementation processes are social interaction processes that
ultimately can be explained by the goals, information, and power of the actors
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involved32, various combinations of settings are discerned and projections of
the course and results of such processes provided. To assess the goals,
information, and power of the actors involved, the elements of the regime can
be used as a check list of relevant circumstances.
Appendix 1 provides a summary of these implementation modules of the
‘policy instrumentation theory’. If insufficient implementation of one or more of
the regime’s incentives seems to be the bottle neck in our case study, these
models can help find the underlying factor(s) that explain the failed
implementation, ultimately going back to the elements of the regime itself. All
elements of the regime can have certain implication for the goals, information,
and power of the actors involved in implementation. The elements can be used
as a sort of checklist when trying to estimate the values of the goals,
information, and power of the actors.
A special aspect of the regime’s elements is connected with the next
success condition, that of integration. But before coming back to that we will
first discuss the direct influence of higher degrees of integration of the
sustainability of water resource use.
Integration. In the EUWARENESS project, the most central condition for
regimes to be successful in sustainable resource management is integration.
This is not because it is more important than validity and implementation, but
because it is connected to the main focus of the project, in which the
transformation to a more integrated regime is seen as a condition for
sustainable resource management. This condition is less obvious than the
importance of validity and implementation. While the basic theorems underlying
the ideas of validity of regime incentives and of the necessity of correct
implementation are not difficult to imagine for a modern policy scholar, the
necessity of integration needs some further theoretical underpinnings. Also,
‘sufficient integration’ can be conceived of as an aspect of the validity of the
policy theory for the design features concerned and as an aspect of
implementation for the process features concerned. But by doing so, its
emphasis would be lost. Given the acknowledged position of the former two in
explaining policy success and failure, the innovation of EUWARENESS in this
respect lies precisely in this emphasis on the possible importance of integration.
   First, we elaborate what forms the integration of a regime can take. We
can use here again the various elements of the governance pattern. When
more than one layer of government is dealing with the same water resource (as
is often the case), integration means that the activities of these governments
are recognised as mutually dependent and as influencing each others' effects.
When more than one actor, especially also a target group, is involved in the
policy, integration means that there is a substantial degree of interaction in the
policy network. When more than one use or user is causing the unsustainable
problem situation, then integration means than the various resulting objectives
are analysed in one framework so that deliberate choices can be made when
goals are conflicting. (Goals are conflicting to the degree that the realisation of
the one goal hampers the realisation of the other goal. Thus, not all different
goals are conflicting.) The same holds for instrumental strategies that are used
                                           
32 Not coincidentally connected to the ‘values, cognitions and resources’ that are discussed in
Chapter 4 as providing the mechanisms of mutual adaptation between the elements of the
regime.
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to attain the different objectives, as well as for the different instruments in a
policy mix. To conclude, integration of the organisation of the implementation
means that responsibilities and resources of various persons or organisations
that are to contribute to the application of the policy are co-ordinated or that
these actors themselves are co-ordinated.
All in all, integration can take various forms that all can contribute to the
integration of the regime as a whole, but all of them do not necessarily provide
decisive contributions to overall integration on their own. To be able to judge
what (combination of) aspects of integration provide the stipulated conditions for
sustainable resource management, it is important to make clear what is to be
expected from integration. In our opinion, the principal benefit of integration is to
prevent negative side-effects from some elements on the positive effects of
other elements on a sustainable resource management and, simultaneously, to
obtain extra opportunities for productive co-operation of various elements of the
regime.
As Ligteringen (1996, 1998) has shown, side-effects of policies can
actually have a bigger impact on the attainment of certain environmental goals
than the specific policies designed to influence that aspect of the problem. She
states that part of these side effects occur indirectly trough influencing major
societal developments that have a substantial effect on sustainability
themselves. These indirect influences resemble the famous IPAT formula
(Impact = Population x Affluence x Technology). Apart from the direct effects on
the targeted behaviour, she also discerns influences from demographic,
economic, cultural and spatial developments. In accordance with the IPAT
formula, we would mention these demographic (P), economic (A) and
technological (T) developments, where technology is considered in its broad
meaning like it was meant to in the IPAT formula (impact = how many x how
much x how). Next to the status of the technical equipment (that can by the way
both improve or worsen the situation), cultural and spatial aspects can be seen
as part of this ‘how’ as well. Because of these indirect influences, there is a
multitude of possible effects of the various elements of the regime on the
sustainability of the resource use. Also, it is possible that the effects of one
instrument are counteracted directly or indirectly by the effects of other regime
characteristics.
On the one hand, this means that ‘integration’ cannot be conceived of as one of
the best ways of dealing with these interactions. For that, the multiple
possibilities are simply too overwhelming. Various forms of integration might
provide for various partial solutions to existing problems. On the other hand, it is
clear that there are even more ways in which a lack of integration can be
detrimental to the regimes’ effects on sustainable use. All in all, it means that
we predict that substantial steps toward more integration will decrease specific
forms of unsustainable use (cf. effect hypothesis 3 of the proposal) and that
even in cases of a valid policy design and good implementation certain
specified forms of lack of integration will cause specific flaws in the
sustainability of the resource use (cf. effect hypothesis 2 of the proposal). The
implementation aspect of hypothesis 2 has already been dealt with above, and
will receive additional attention below.
Phrased in a simple and straightforward way, these hypotheses read as follows:
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(1) Complex regimes with low integration will be more likely to lead to over-use
and degradation of water resources or inability to protect the ecological
functions of the water resource.
(2) Integrated water regimes will be more likely to be able to prevent over-use
and degradation of water resources and to protect the ecological functions
of the water resource.
For the case study methodology, this means that we should not try to measure
some general degree of ‘integration’ to be correlated with a general
measurement of ‘sustainability’, but instead try to specify the pathway along
with specific forms of (lack of) integration in the case under study have caused
specific forms of improvements (or specific problems) in the sustainability of the
resource use. Since not all differentiation and complexity is bad, the analysis in
the cases should assess what specific problems regarding the sustainability of
the resource use certain differentiations did cause and to what extent the later
integration solves these problems without creating new ones.
For an additional impact of better integration, we need to go back to the
implementation condition. In a dynamic context and surrounded by uncertainties
regarding the problem and possible solutions, an adaptive and learning form of
policy implementation is important. Such a policy style depends on the uneasy
combination of both pluralism (e.g. allowing complexity, openness,
differentiation) to give room for challenging stimuli and on the other side co-
ordination (e.g. integration, consensus seeking devices) to be able to produce
new solutions on the basis of these challenges (Arentsen, Bressers & O’Toole,
PSJ, forthcoming 2000).
Cases in which consensus seeking devices are strong, but pluralism is
restricted to ‘insiders’ (like the ‘iron triangle’ of agriculture has been for a long
time in many countries) are, however, vulnerable to becoming too closed for
external stimuli that would provide the system with timely incentives to adapt
and learn. Cases in which pluralism is strong, but no strong devices press for a
co-ordinated agreement (like in some examples of US environmental policy)
lack the incentives to explore win – win situations or at least profitable trade-
offs.
For our analysis, this means that the role of integration is connected to
the ability to incorporate complexity in productive collective action. While we
assume goals, information, and power of the actors involved as the key (or:
core) circumstances that explain the course and results of social interaction
processes (see appendix 1) this means that we assume that more integration
correlates with less unproductive constellations of goals, information, and power
of the actors involved in the implementation process.
By (full) integration we mean:
- that levels are more mutually interacting and are aware of their mutual
dependencies,
- that actors belong more to ‘policy communities’ rather than ‘issue networks’,
implying more interaction and consensus orientation,
- that interrelatedness of different aspects of the problem and their
dependencies are recognised and intensely debated and goals are set
accordingly,
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- that the policy mix contains instruments that are mutually reinforcing each
others incentives,
- that the implementing organisations share their resources and co-operate
intensively to complement each other.
Under such circumstances, the goals of the implementers and target groups
involved in the implementation process can be expected to be less likely in
discord, especially because of the second and third aspect of a more integrated
regime. All elements of a more integrated regime can be assumed to contribute
to a lesser degree of experienced uncertainty by and increase in information
exchanges and a lower degree of distrust. (In the short run, more awareness of
the various sides of the coin can cause confusion, but in the somewhat longer
run the ‘surprises’ that are caused by an initially too simple view of reality will
cause more distrust and uncertainty than open information exchange.) What
integration will do with the power balance between implementers and target
groups is that there will typically be less possibilities for target groups to play
the implementers off against each other and more standard operation
procedures for the solution of conflict.
Our hypotheses are that:
(3) In the implementation process, the additional fragmentation that is typical for
complex regimes will tend to lead to more discord between the actors
(goals), more uncertainty (information), and more stalemates (power) and,
thereby, can hamper implementation.
(4) In the implementation process, integration of the regime will tend to lead to
less discord (due to more ‘win-win’- solution creativity), less (subjective)
uncertainty (due to more exchange of information and less distrust) and less
stalemates (due to less possibilities for target groups to play the
implementers off against each other and more standard operation
procedures for the solution of conflict).
All in all, the expectations that are phrased in hypotheses 3 and 4 imply that a
more integrated regime can outperform an equally complex but fragmented one
not only through the direct effects of more mutually reinforcing and less
mutually destructive side effects on the resource use, but also through the
indirect effects on the quality of the implementation process.
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8 Conclusion
Overview scheme: See research proposal
The structure of the variables involved in the theoretical explanation is the
following one:
1. Change agents (many implying or stimulating differentiation; some pushing
for integration): e.g. demographic, economic, technological,  institutional,
and cultural developments and the feedback from the problem situation
2. Initial changes in directly affected regime elements implying more
complexity and sometimes more integration
3. Adjustments by other regime elements to initial changes through adaptive
mechanisms involving values, cognitions, and resources
4. A. More complex regimes B. More integrated regimes
(‘multi’-format of elements) (high intensity of exchange)
5. A. More complete coverage B. More successful implementation +
of uses and users + more risk more mutually reinforcing side effects
of intra regime counter activity of regime elements
6. A. Indications of a more B. Indications of a more sustainable
sustainable water resource water resource use due to better
use due to better coverage implementation and more positive
(cf. previous situation) + and less negative side effects
indication of threats to





A brief sketch of “Instrumentation Theory”
Introduction
Many implementation studies set out not only to identify policy outputs, but also to
explain them. These explanations vary from case to case, putting forward a vast
array of factors, both in the Netherlands as in other countries. The policy may
have run aground because `the municipalities responsible for implementation
were not sufficiently motivated', `there were staff shortages', `the guidelines
arrived late', `the applicants did not understand the subsidy arrangements', `there
was insufficient support in society', `the statements of the under-secretary spread
confusion in the media', to mention but a few. There are two disadvantages to
such ad-hoc explanations. First of all, though they may contain some degree of
truth, they rarely tell the whole story. Mostly the identified factor or factors could
only exert influence in combination with other factors which, in themselves, need
not adversely affect implementation. For instance, a lack of motivation on the part
of the municipalities to implement the policy is only a decisive factor if these
municipalities enjoy a large degree of discretion (or can afford to act like that:
actual discretion). However, a large degree of discretion in itself needs not to
prevent effective implementation.
Secondly, ad-hoc explanations do not engender a cumulation of
knowledge of factors that influence policy implementation. The studies show little
uniformity, being based on different terms and levels of abstraction. As a result,
information from new research cannot be tested against predictions based on
earlier research. It is possible, up to a point, to induce certain general factors from
the concrete factors mentioned in the various studies. Indeed, this was done at an
early stage (e.g. in the Netherlands: Hoogerwerf, 1977, Hoogerwerf, 1983, cf.
Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, Mazmanian & Sabatier, (1989, 1983). But the
interaction between these general factors, the way in which they reinforce or
weaken each other's influence, is rarely taken into consideration. Another
drawback is that these general factors tend to remain fairly abstract. As a result,
they are not often used in practice as a basis for hypotheses, but rather as a basis
for fruitful diagrams for the clear classification of ad-hoc explanations. But in order
to achieve cumulative knowledge of the factors that influence policy
implementation and effectiveness, it is vital to develop theories with explanatory
power.
A feature of the Dutch implementation studies field is that there has been
some works that not only state the importance of the formulation of explanatory
and predictive theory, but also actually develop and apply such theory. Such a
theory, developed in the Netherlands, is the `instrumentation theory', which is the
subject of the present section. The theory derives its name from the fact that it
was developed to facilitate the comparison of policy instruments. One of its basic
assumptions is that the working of policy instruments cannot be seen in isolation
from the circumstances in which they are applied. The theory therefore not only
looks at the characteristics of policy instruments and their impact on target groups,
but also at the policy implementation processes. Its first version was developed in
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1986 (Bressers & Klok, 1987, 1988). After a series of empirical studies (a.o. Klok,
1987, Grimbergen e.a, 1988, Kraan-Jetten, 1991), which generally provided
evidence supporting the theory, a further clarification of concepts and theorems
led to the second version (Klok, 1991). Thereafter, new empirical studies followed
(e.g. Pullen, 1992). Naturally, the treatment in this paper will only be a summary.
Interaction processes and instrumentation theory
An elaboration of thinking in terms of policy processes is to emphasize the
character of these processes as social interaction processes, as has been the
case in the Twente policy sciences approach. Here, attention has shifted from
viewing policy as a sort of production process with semifinished products and
an end product to a vision in which the actors participating in the process are
the central concern. In this vision the course and outcomes of the processes
depend not only on the inputs to the process but mainly on the characteristics of
the actors involved, particularly their objectives, information and power. All other
factors that influence the process do so because, and in so far as, they
influence the characteristics of the actors involved. This also applies to the
influence of policy instruments. Not all characteristics of actors, however, are
determined by policy, and so it is not possible to describe a policy without
paying attention to the actors involved in that policy. These actors are,
therefore, allocated a place in a graphic model of the policy (Bressers, 1983).
Moreover, the processes in this vision are not only linked in one series or
cycle, but are part of a large number of societal processes in which government
authorities sometimes participate and sometimes do not. All these processes
are connected to other processes in a complicated web via their inputs and
outputs, and possibly indirectly linked to all other processes. Each definition of a
sector of society draws a more or less arbitrary boundary round a cluster of
processes in this web. In practice, the boundaries that are drawn between
policy development and policy implementation are the same as those between
a higher and lower tiers of government (Bressers 1983; Honigh 1985; Bressers
& Honigh 1986).
The ‘instrumentation theory’ which stems from this perspective focuses
on the application and effects of instruments on the target groups of policy
(Bressers & Klok 1987; Bressers, Klok, Kuks & Lulofs 1988; Klok 1991). It also
takes account of the fact that instruments do not influence the characteristics of
the actors involved separately but rather as a package or as an ‘instrumentation
strategy’. Instruments and strategies have various properties, for example a
certain proportionality between target group behaviour and government reaction
to this behaviour, or giving resources to the target group or taking these
resources away from the target group. Such properties of instrument strategies
affect their applicability in practice. Klok emphasizes that some of the
instruments are designed to give those implementing the policy the power to
apply other instruments (Klok 1991: 176-194) and also that the implementing
organizations depend on being equipped with sufficient capacity and expertise
(idem: 163-164; see also Bressers 1983: 218-237 and 256-274). In his thesis,
Arentsen (1991) exhaustively discusses the relation between the policy
organization and policy implementation.
Later publications on this approach (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Bressers
1993; Bressers, O’Toole & Richardson 1994; Bressers, Huitema & Kuks 1994)
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have paid more attention to the interrelations between the actors, including
actors that do not directly participate in the processes under examination. Klok
(1995) gives primary importance to the allocation and removal of resources in
such relations and in the classification of policy instruments. The mutual
relations between actors within such policy networks are seen as an important
factor in the development of the content of policy (Ligteringen 1999). In addition,
the relation between policy processes at the various administrative levels is
explicitly dealt with (Bressers, Kuks & Ligteringen 1998). During this theoretical
development, the approach to policy as an interactive process and the
instrumentation theory based on this gradually grew into an integrative policy
science approach, uniting elements from a variety of other approaches
Explaining implementation with “Instrumentation Theory”
The theory assumes that the policy implementation process is not only about
implementation, but also about attempts to prevent implementation or to change
the character of what is implemented. The process involves activities and
interactions between the implementing government officials and the members of
the target group. Often the same actors already maintain contact with each other
in connection with other matters. Moreover government and target group often
exert influence on each other before the policy that is to be implemented is
introduced. The new policy does not replace this interactive process, but adds a
new element to it. Therefore, to assess the possibility of the new instruments
being applied and correctly applied, it is necessary first of all to gain insight into
the factors determining the nature of the interactive process between government
and target group. We can then try to find out how these factors change due to the
introduction of the new policy instruments (Bressers & Ringeling, 1989).
Another basic assumption of the theory is that the factors which influence
the implementation process do not operate in isolation of each other (cf. Renate
Mayntz, 1983). The influence of the various factors cannot be simply added up. A
factor that exercises a positive influence under certain circumstances, may
exercise no influence, or indeed a negative influence, under other circumstances.
The way in which these processes develop must therefore be explained on the
basis of combinations of the values of the various distinctive factors. This means,
that hypotheses on the relationship between the dependent variable and only one
independent variable at the time, with a `ceteris paribus' assumption regarding
other independent variables, are regarded as unproductive.
Though this basic assumption is undoubtedly more realistic, it creates
severe complexity problems for theory formulation. In fact, if one assumes 15
independent variables to be important to the development and results of the
implementation process, than even if one treats these variables as dichotomies,
no less than 32.768 combinations of circumstances or `settings' can occur.
Because many of the relevant variables cannot validly be operationalized as
quantitative measures computerized modeling provides no escape.
Instead this complexity is made `manageable' by discerning two sets to
independent variables. These factors are divided into `core circumstances' (i.e.
factors that have a direct influence on the development of the processes) and
external circumstances (i.e. factors that have an indirect influence via their
influence on the core circumstances). The applied policy instruments can also be
counted among these `external circumstances'. The theory indicates how the core
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circumstances jointly determine the development and results of a process.
External circumstances, including characteristics of the policy instruments that are
to be implemented, are taken into consideration when estimating the value of the
core circumstances. In this way many circumstances can be taken into account
without increasing exponentially the complexity of the theory. The number of
settings remains limited as they are determined by a limited number of central
circumstances. These central circumstances are the goals, information and
sources of power of the actors involved (cf. Chapter 4).
Likelihood of implementation
The policy implementation process is typically characterized by the interactions
between the government and the target group of the policy. The application of a
certain policy instrument often takes up a less prominent place in this process
than one would be led to expect on the basis of official procedures. The actual
granting of permits to those members of the target group who are required to hold
permits, the actual imposition of levies, the application of sanctions when regulati-
ons are violated: none of these can be taken for granted in the practical process.
The first result of the implementation process can therefore be indicated as the
possibility that the instrument will be applied at all. Sometimes this result may
have the side-effect of undermining the credibility of the policy, particularly if
implementation fails to get off the ground.
It is quite conceivable that not only the members of the target group but
also the government body responsible for implementation attach little importance
to the application of the instrument. Implementers have values and interests of
their own, which may not coincide which the activities involved or even the policy
as such. The Dutch Nuisance Act, for instance, has been typified as a symbolic
act, because for years no one lifted a finger to put it into practice. In fact, it is even
open to question whether the policy-makers ever intended it to be implemented
(Aalders, 1984). So the first group of factors which determines the possibility that
the policy instruments are applied consists of the objectives of the implementers
and the target group. To put it more specifically, the central question is whether
the actual application of the instrument will contribute to the achievement of their
own objectives.
The successful application of policy instruments also depends on whether
those involved have sufficient information. The first question to ask in this
connection is whether the policy implementers know who makes up the target
group. Do they know, for instance, which companies are obliged to have a permit
or which ones qualify for a subsidy? If the target group itself stands to gain from
the application of the instrument, e.g. in the case of subsidies, then information
available to the members of the target group may also greatly help increase the
possibility of application. This concerns information about the way in which they
can benefit from the instrument.
The third group of factors that determines the development of the
implementation process is the distribution of power between the implementers
and the members of the target group. First of all, who is empowered to apply the
instrument and how far does this power go? The power may rest exclusively with
the implementers. But in some cases, e.g. subsidies, the instrument can only be
applied at the request of the members of the target group. The target group then
enjoys an extremely strong position if it is not in favour of the application of the
instrument. Other forms of power may derive from formal sources (e.g.
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opportunities to appeal) and informal sources (e.g. dependence on other party for
the achievement of other objectives).
The combination of circumstances (values of the various factors)
determines the kind of interaction that will occur between the government and the
target group in the policy implementation process. The theory makes a distinction
between three types of interaction: partnership, cooperation and resistance.
Partnership occurs when both parties share a common goal. We speak of
cooperation when one of the parties adopts a relatively passive attitude which
neither hinders nor stimulates the application of the policy instrument. Resistance,
of course, speaks for itself. There are also situations in which there will be no
interaction at all between the government and the target group. In this case the
possibility that the instrument will be applied is very remote indeed.
Diagram 1 gives an overview of the circumstances in the implementation process
and the types of interaction and results to be expected from the application of
instruments in these circumstances. The flow chart rests on nine theorems that in
the space of this section cannot be elaborated upon.
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[diagram 1: one page]
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Degree of correct implementation
The mere application of a policy instrument does not automatically lead to the
envisaged change in the consequences of the behavioral alternatives of the target
group. The application may not be up to standard; for instance, levies may be
lower than originally intended, or permits may not specify restrictive regulations, or
grants may not be accompanied by the intended conditions. The question in such
cases is not whether the policy implementers themselves are breaking the law or
other regulations, nor whether they deviate from the instrument-as-intended as
such. Empirical implementation research has shown that deviations can actually
be motivated by concern for goal-attainment by the implementers. The dependent
variable here is, whether the impact of the instrument on the consequences of the
behavioral alternatives of the target group is less far-reaching than originally
envisaged by the policy-makers.
The factors that determine the character of the interaction process
between government and target group on this point are virtually identical to those
mentioned earlier: objectives, information and power. Nevertheless, we still need
a separate analysis diagram as the factors may take on very different values and
the types of interaction are more complex than those that occur in respect of the
possibility of application. For instance, the members of the target group may well
favor the application of a subsidy in itself, but oppose correct application as this
would bind them to all sorts of regulations. Or, in another situation, implementers
may have sufficient information to identify those members of the target group who
require permits, but have insufficient information to know what regulations should
and can be applied to the companies in question.
The types of interaction that may occur in respect of correct application are
to a certain extent different from those in respect of the possibility of application.
This is because the degree of correct application involves a much larger number
of aspects. The degree of correct application, for instance, not only concerns the
question whether a company required to hold a permit will indeed obtain one, but
also whether that permit will be adequate, i.e. contain all regulations necessary to
achieve the policy objective. It is precisely the formulation of these regulations that
is the most difficult part of the negotiations between government and industry.
Furthermore, the concept `degree of correct application' assumes that a certain
degree of application takes place. If the instruments are not applied, the degree of
correct application lacks all significance. The application of policy instruments
almost necessarily leads to interaction, so it will be impossible for the result to be
`no' interaction, as in diagram 1. A distinction is made between constructive, but
also obstructive partnership, constructive and obstructive cooperation, negotiation
and conflict. Obstructive partnership occurs in situations where both companies
stand to gain from incorrect application. The same phenomenon may occur with
cooperation when one or both parties have an interest in the application of the
instrument - e.g. because non-application would be rather too obvious to higher
authorities -but not in the correct application of the instrument. In view of the many
aspects involved in the correct application of the instrument, it is useful to
subdivide the interaction type `resistance' into negotiation and conflict. In the case
of negotiations, the parties do their utmost to realize as many of their own objec-
tives as possible by reaching a compromise. In the case of conflict, the target
group usually breaks the lines of communication and confronts the other party
with a negative use of power. In the latter case, the target group will generally
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question the legality of the instrument. Finally, with some combinations of circum-
stances the interaction type and result are highly uncertain.
Diagram 2 gives an overview of the situations and predicted interaction types and
results in respect of the degree of correct application of the instrument. This flow
chart rests on eleven theorems, that cannot be elaborated upon in the context of
this section.
78
[diagram 2: one page]
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The implementation of a policy may involve the deployment of more than one
instrument. In fact, different instruments are frequently applied at different stages
of implementation. For instance, the first step in applying a permit system will be
to issue permits specifying certain regulations; the second step will be to enforce
these regulations. Therefore, to generate a comprehensive explanation of the
results of the policy implementation processes, the parts of the theory described
here will often have to be applied several times.
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Appendix 2
Criteria for case selection
The criteria for case selection are mentioned as a second deliverable and an
appendix in the first report (page 18). In this appendix we present the criteria
that evolved from the logic of the study and the discussions the research team





In the first Annex to the Description of Work (October 15, 1999) we mention a
list of indicators for the variables we are measuring as a part of the first
deliverable. In the second Annex we mention that the case studies will follow
not only the operationalisation of the central concepts that evolves from the
elaboration of the theoretical framework, but also ‘regular state of the art case
study methodology’ (Yin, 1994) and elements of a case study protocol that
many of the partners used before in an EU sponsored project (Waste facilities
siting; Dente, Fareri & Ligteringen, 1998).
Of course not all elements of the latter two references apply here. Where
there is some discongruence between the EUWARENESS set-up and the
background and purpose of these mentioned literature, the EUWARENESS set-
up should be applied. The same holds for the definitions presented in Dente,
Fareri & Ligteringen. One should be aware of the fact that this protocol was not
meant to analyse regime changes and their effect on resource use, but to
analyse decision making processes on large investments with directs effects on
local environmental quality. An important aspect of this case study protocol
however is the three phases that are discerned (Dente, Fareri & Ligteringen,
1998: 214):
- the construction of the chronology;
- the analysis of the actors involved;
- the analysis of the patterns of interaction and the definition of the success
factors.
Our suggestion is that also the EUWARENESS case studies begin with a
historical description of the case first, followed by a more systematic
assessment of the key variables and concluded by an analysis of the relations
that are represented by the hypotheses (cf. chapters 7-11 of Ligteringen, 1999).
A list of key variables in the EUWARENESS case studies is the following:
1. The five elements of governance (see section 3.2 for their description).
2. The four elements of property rights (see chapter 4 for their description).
3. External change agents and their differentiating of integrating character.
4. The sequence of change through the regime elements (see below for an
operationalisation of these patterns).
5. The three mechanisms of value adaptation, integration of interpretation
frameworks and resources dependencies and exchange (see section 3.3
and below for an operationalisation of these mechanisms).
6. The resulting level of complexity (preferably per element of the regime; see
chapters 5 and 7 for an operationalisation of this concept).
7. The resulting level of integration (preferably per element of the regime; see
chapters 5 and 7 for an operationalisation of this concept).
8. The instrumental validity and completeness of the ‘policy theory’ of the
resource regime (see chapter 7 for a short elaboration).
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9. The level of adequacy of implementation of the strategies in the resource
regime (if possibly insufficient than try to explain with the help of
‘instrumentation theory’ and its variables; see appendix 1).
10. Indications for negative and/or positive side effects of regime elements on
the effects of other regime elements.
11. The indications for more or less sustainable resource use (see for the
description of (un-)sustainable resource use chapter 2).
Additional variables are connected with hypothesis 2 on regime change (on the
relation between the characteristics of the changes and the initial balances in
the regime elements, e.g. powerful target groups protecting their interests). Also
other variables are related to the co-efficacy of property rights and government
intervention (see chapter 6) and on the relation between the level of integration
and the quality of implementation (see chapter 7, hypotheses 3 and 4 on regime
effects).
The relationships between the various elements of governance and the
mechanisms that explain them are elaborated more fully and systematically in
the following pages. These could be used as a source of reference to compare
developments in the cases with. Mind that when we speak of ‘resources’ here
the resources and organisation of the implementation are meant.
‘Top-down’ influences: relations in the stated order of governance elements
The ‘continuation’ and ‘logical order’ relations between the elements of the
governance model will not be further elaborated. In fact, the perspectives of
continuation and logical order (each previous element forms logically restricts
the degrees of freedom of the following one) are the basis of these relations.
This is less obvious with the relations discussed below. The arrows indicate that
the first named element in this relation has an influence on the second named
element.
Level → Problem and ambition
From the value perspective we can expect that the sort of values that
characterize a certain level of administration will work through in the perception
of the problem and the policy ambition. Many values are not peculiar to a
particular administrative level, but the administrative level provides an indication
of the level at which equality or balance is sought.
From the cognitive perspective (interpretation frameworks) the problem will be
perceived at the level from which it is viewed. The problem of waste, for
example, looks different at the national level (e.g. safe processing) than at the
local level (e.g. impact of waste processing plants).
From the perspective of resources the dominant level, as ‘owner’ of the
problem, will tend to conduct the debate about the problem and policy ambition
as it affects that level. If there are other levels that have a strong position this
may lead to fragmentation of the perception of the problem and policy ambition.
In the end, the composition of aspects that play a role in the perception of the




From the perspective of values, there are not many values linked to the
selection of the administrative level, except the values held at the level at which
a balance is desired (equality). The choice of strategy will reflect this.
From the cognitive perspective, strategies will be developed primarily for
dealing with the problem at the level at which the policy is being developed or at
least from which there is a clear view of the problem. If governance is divided
between a number of levels, policy strategies will be developed at more than
one level.
From the resources/dominance perspective there will be a tendency to select
policy strategies that do not threaten the distribution of responsibilities for
developing policy at the various levels. In the end, we see here, too, that the
characteristics of the chosen strategies will to a certain extent reflect the
distribution of responsibilities between the various levels.
Level → Resources
This concerns a big leap over the more stepwise relationships between these
two elements. This means that there may not be much left for a direct influence
of one element over the other.
From the values perspective an attempt will be made to create a certain
balance, not only in the way the problem is tackled but also in the allocation of
resources between the various subareas of the administrative levels.
From the cognitive perspective the allocation of resources will mainly reflect
what the problem is perceived to be, but this is an indirect relation via the
problem perception.
From the resources perspective, the resources distributed will mainly be those
that are available at the level concerned.
Network → Strategies
Here the ‘network–instrumentation model’ is relevant (Bressers 1993; Bressers
& O’Toole 1999; Ligteringen 1999), which deals with aspects of objectives,
information/approachability and power/resources.
From the values perspective strategies will be selected that are appropriate to
the degree of consistency between the values held by the actors.
From the cognitive perspective it is important whether the government and
target groups (representatives) develop an interpretation framework through a
process of negotiation or that there are ‘difficult to reach’ target groups.
From the resources perspective what is important is the question of the extent
to which the party conducting policy is dominant or is strongly dependent on the
cooperation of other actors.
Network → Resources
From the values perspective and from the cognitive perspective the influence of
the composition of the network will probably be transmitted via the problem
perception and policy ambitions.
From the resources perspective the distribution of resources is primarily
influenced by the network because people tend to help others in their own or
allied organizations. This leads to ‘who gets what’ games, irrespective of the
resources needed for certain strategies.
84
Problem and ambition → Resources
From the values perspective we can expect – irrespective of the objective
resource requirements for the chosen instruments, which is, after all, the line of
‘logical order’ – that resources will be allocated to those objectives related to the
problem that are perceived to be the most serious (a form of symbolic
allocation). In the world of politics you often see that ‘extra money is provided
for solving the problem of waiting lists in the health service’ without it being
clear what that money can be used for.
From the cognitive perspective we can expect something similar, but this time
based on the choice of intervention points within the policy field: changeable
causes or symptoms of the problem. Here, too, there is no need of a direct
relation with the activities for which the resources are needed.
From the resources perspective we can expect the global effect that the more
serious the problem and the higher the level of ambition, the total willingness to
acquire the resources will increase.
‘Bottom-up’ influences: influences along the feedback flows
In this section the arrows in the headings represent a tendency for the second
named element to adjust to the first named element. In this case, though, the
influences discussed are in the reverse order to the one defined in the ‘logical
order’. For example, the division of resources influences the (further elaboration
of) the strategies instead of the selected strategies influencing the (distribution
of) resources.
Resources → Strategies
From the values perspective we can expect that the method of implementing
policy strategies will be linked to the question of whether sufficient resources
have been made available for the intended implementation. If this is not the
case and resources have to be removed from other tasks to compensate, then
value conflicts will arise, and these will be resolved by not fully implementing
the strategy concerned. In effect, this means changing the strategy.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the way the strategy and
instruments are interpreted will be influenced by the resources that are made
available. If these resources appear to push the implementation in a certain
direction or influence the effort put into implementing the policy the conception
of what the strategies and instruments are will be adapted to meet these
effects. Because ‘what is believed to be real is real in its consequences’ the
strategy will actually be changed.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the resources
made available (and other features of the implementation situation) will be
taken by those executing the strategy as the starting point when determining
how people deal with the strategies and instruments in practice, in many cases
in an attempt to retain as much as possible of the original purpose (bottom-up
argument).
Resources → Problem and ambition
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From a values perspective we can expect that the policy ambitions will be
measured partly against the resources made available. If there is a
discrepancy, and, as a result, resources have to be taken away from other
problems, value conflicts will arise and these will be resolved by not attempting
to fulfil the relevant policy ambitions in their entirety. In effect, the policy
ambitions will be changed.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the way the perception of the
problem and the policy ambition are interpreted by those executing the policy
will be influenced by the available resources. If these resources appear to push
the implementation in a certain direction or influence the effort put into
implementing the policy, the conception of what the primary issue is and what
the actual policy ambitions are will be adjusted. Because ‘what is believed to be
real is real in its consequences’ this will in effect mean a change in the
emphasis placed on aspects of the problem and the ambition of the policy.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that that the
resources made available can also strengthen or weaken the importance of the
position held by those executing the policy with respect to the perception of the
problem and the selection of policy ambitions, and this may influence later
choices. What this all means is that the policy ambitions are extended or pruned
back to fit the available resources.
Resources → Network
From a values perspective we can expect that frustration or satisfaction with the
distribution of resources will influence the motives of the actors in the network.
From the cognitive perspective we can expect that the actors that have received
most resources will be seen to be the most important actors in the network, or
may even enter the network because they are provided with resources by other
actors for the application of the strategies and instruments.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the actors in the
network, under the influence of the distribution of resources, will seek to form
coalitions that match this distribution, and may seek to co-operate with actors
that possess resources they do not have and vice versa.
Resources → Level
From a values perspective we can expect the administrative level that receives
the most resources to (continue to) feel most responsibility for the problem.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect the administrative level receiving
the most resources to strengthen its own interpretation of the problem as one
belonging primarily to that administrative level.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the administrative level
receiving the most resources will, partly as a result of this, retain the strongest
position.
Strategies → Problem and policy ambition
From a values perspective we can expect that those aspects of the problem
that come over most clearly as an object of intervention in the selected strategy
will be considered most important.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the presence of a certain
strategy will make those aspects of the problem most noticeable that are the
clearest objects of intervention.
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From a resources perspective we can expect that the selected strategy will
strengthen the position of certain parts of the problem in the debate and
strengthen the position of certain policy ambitions. All in all, there are signs here
of what is referred to in the literature as ‘solutions in search of a problem’.
Strategies → Network
From a values perspective we can expect that the strategies and instruments
allocate certain responsibilities to actors, as a result of which these actors will
redefine their responsibilities and will then set out to achieve other goals
(compare the gradual influence of the allocation of water quality tasks on the
environmental awareness of the water authorities).
From a cognitive perspective we can expect the features of the chosen
strategies to influence the perception of the way individuals in the network deal
with one another and of who belongs in the network and who does not. A tough
enforcement strategy based on deterrence may lead to a perception that
relations within part of the network are more strained. Consensual management
strategies may bring about the opposite.
From a resources (and power) perspective we can expect that the importance
of the role that actors play in the implementation also more generally influences
their relative importance in the network.
Strategies → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the division of responsibilities
between administrative levels associated with a particular strategy influences
what people think about who should have these responsibilities, also
concerning administrative level.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the strategy raises the level of
knowledge of the problem and the possible responses mostly in the
administrative level that has most to do.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the position of the
administrative levels that have a more important role in the selected strategy
will be strengthened relative to other levels. All these phenomena appear to be
present in the Netherlands because of the rise of the target group approach,
which has strengthened the national level (at which most covenants are agreed)
with respect to the provincial and local levels (where most of the licenses are
issued and which carry out most of the enforcement duties).
Problem and policy ambition → Network
From a values perspective we can expect that a multifaceted problem
perception may lead to responsibilities being assigned to, and accepted by,
more actors than in the case of a one-dimensional problem perception.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that a problem perception in which
many actors are viewed to be involved in the problem can lead to more actors
that have the idea that it concerns them than when the problem is regarded as
only the business of a special group.
From a resources perspective we can expect that a problem perception and
policy ambition that are found to be a positive or a negative factor by certain
actors will also assign a special position in the network to these same actors. All
in all we can state that simple problem perceptions can lead to a more closed
network than more fragmented, multifaceted problem perceptions. Such
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influences were ascertained in the concluding analysis of the ‘white book’, in
which shifts in the network were related to the challenges put before the
network by the incorporation of the environmental issue and the question of
government funding.
Problem and policy ambition → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the way in which the problem is
described has implications for the administrative level that ought to feel most
responsible for the problem.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect a similar effect to occur regarding
the question of what is considered to be the most suitable administrative level in
the dominant paradigm, given the scale of the problems.
From a resources perspective we can expect that, for a particular problem, a
certain paradigm will strengthen or weaken the relative position of
administrative levels in relation to the others.
Network → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the dominant values of the actors
in the network (as opposed to their own interests) can be relevant for the
distribution of governance over the various levels.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the dominant policy vision of
the actors in the network can be relevant for the distribution of governance over
the various levels.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the dominant actors in the
network will also influence the distribution of governance between the
administrative levels and that this distribution will be a reflection of the relative
position of the dominant actors.
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